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Drawing from extensive existing sources which focus respectively on two types of intra-party 
politics, including books, journals, PhD dissertations and media accounts, this thesis sets out to 
compare two types of factionalism as seen in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. Factionalism is examined under two dimensions: the 
historical dimension and contemporary dimension. This thesis explores how factionalism has 
influenced their respective party affairs. I divide this factional comparison into three stages 
according to certain political background, namely, the opposition stage, the ruling stage and the 
present stage. By comparing two manifestations of factionalism in each stage, I identify their 
shared characteristics and respective uniqueness. Through examining each factionalism 
chronically during the selected three stages, two detailed factionalism evolvement pictures are 
presented. My key discovery is that factionalism plays contrasting roles in the two parties. 
Specifically, factionalism acts as a destructive factor that causes disunity, political conflicts of all 
sorts and eventually leads to legitimacy erosion in the CCP. However, at the same time, it is 
factionalism that elicits the strongest political forces and helps facilitate compromise formation in 
the DPP.  
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Note on the Romanization of Chinese names  
 
As the Chinese pinyin and Taiwanese in roman alphabets are quite different, for most of 
the names mentioned in this paper I adopt the Chinese pingyin to represent. However, 
when it comes to the names of certain Taiwanese politicians which have already 
become predominantly well-known in their original formats, such as Tsai Ing-wen and 
Ma Ying-jeou, I made no changes. As to the majority of Taiwanese names, I use 
Chinese pinyin to represent for the convenience of my own and also for Chinese pinyin 
















With the conclusion of the 19th Party Congress in late October, 2017, Xi Jinping secured himself 
a solid position on par with Deng Xiaoping(if not Mao Zedong) in the party-state regime. While 
the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) was preserved, the fact that Xi Thought (or Xi Jinping 
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era) was chartered to Party 
Constitution and Xi Jinping’s own political position being elevated to the “Core” denounced the 
end of intra-party democracy in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). CCP factionalism entered 
into a stage where Xi faction is the only dominant force and other factions were either completely 
uprooted or forced to operate covertly. Across the Taiwan Strait, the DPP is posing a 
diametrically different stance. Having just made a glorious return in the presidential election as 
well as in the Legislative Yuan election, the DPP’s widely-acknowledged factional collectivism 
survived numerous severe political turmoil, showing high degree of resilience. 
     Factionalism that deals with both the splitting of groups (parties) and conflicts of factions (see, 
Wikitionary) has long been the undisputed inlet towards understanding Chinese and Taiwanese 
politics. Academics (for example, Nathan 1995; Dittmer 2003, Chen 2012, and Huang 2017) 
concur that the two political systems both encompass a myriad of interpersonal networks that 
are hinged on guanxi. On the party level, nearly all of the parties present themselves as 
homogeneous. Instead, they are uniformly comprised of multiple intra-party groups that are 
highly active and inclined to dissonance. In the past, studies on factionalism within the CCP were 
either overly occupied with the Cultural Revolution (CR) or revolved around the power 
succession themes. Works from a comparative angle were meager if not completely absent. In 
Taiwanese party politics, factionalism was first brought to public’s attention through the studies 
of Kuomintang’s (KMT) co-option over local elites for electoral ends (see, Chen 1995). Later, as 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) slowly joined in the power game against the KMT, 
factionalism began to be intimately associated with the DPP’s intra-party rivalry and cooperation 
in elite politics. In fact, the DPP’s birth was essentially the coalescing of out-party groups (Dang 
Wai Zu Zhi). However, despite the fact that DPP was always empowered by factional 
cooperation, it suffered from factional conflicts that eventually would undercut its electoral 
capacity. Similar to the CCP, factionalism of the DPP was barely scrutinized from a comparative 
perspective, despite the fact that these two parties share large ground of similarities such as 
their origin backgrounds and the extent of elitism of party members . 
The thesis is designed to identify the similarities and differences of factionalism in the CCP 
and the DPP with a dyadic coordinate, i.e., the historical Y-axis (vertical) and the contemporary 
X-axis (horizontal). Through historical comparison of the two party’s factional activities, I hope to 




differences between the subjects, and possibly some ambiguities in between. This historical 
approach is entrusted to lay a solid foundation for factionalism comparison that is in 
contemporary context. In the contemporary comparison section, I will apply the findings to the 
explanation of current factional configuration of both two parties while expecting new discoveries. 
Ultimately, readers of this thesis are expected to identify three contributions: first, a systematic 
streamlining of factionalism history of the major Cross-Strait parties; second, an outline of 
current politics in China and Taiwan; and lastly, an effective paradigm that helps the observers of 
grand China politics to dive deeper into regional political analysis. In the first section, I will touch 
upon factionalism in general and probe for the special characteristics of factionalism in the 
Chinese culture context. The second section deals with brief factional chronologies of the two 
parties: I plan to include consensual informal groups that were frequently used by previous 
scholars or overseas media agencies for the CCP due to the covertness of its factional activities, 
such as the Shanghai faction led by Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping would naturally be characterized as 
a member from the princelings, the famous youth league and so on. Factions within the DPP 
have always been an obvious existence, hence a comparatively clearer historical summary. 
Throughout this paper, analytical weight will be put on the characteristics of factions including 
composition, operation, the degree of institutionalization, functionality, stability as well as 
sustainability in order to identify similarities and differences between the parties. At the center of 
today’s political reality across the Taiwan Strait are two party leaders, namely, Xi Jinping and 
Tsai Ing-wen. Arguably, it is Xi Jinping’s sole resolution that altered the direction of the Chinese 
elitist politics. In terms of personal power, Tsai is not on par with her mainland counterpart, 
however, Tsai’s victory is the perfect manifestation of resilience of the DPP. Therefore, the third 
section will concentrate on comparing these two leaders. By reviewing their political endeavors 
and comparing factional activities, I wish to shed light on current factional landscape of the two 
parties. The last section will be a final conclusion drawing upon findings from both historical and 











2. Factionalism as Seen in the Theories 
     In this chapter, I will touch upon the theoretical basis of this thesis by defining a 
factionalism that is best suitable for the grand Chinese politics. Then, I will present a 
comprehensive review on the existing studies on Chinese factionalism so as to lay a solid 
foundation for the factionalism comparison theory in chapter 3 of which I intend to apply in 
this thesis. 
2.1 Defining Factionalism 
     What is a faction? Different scholars at different times formulated different definitions, 
however, the variation of these definitions is quite small. Most of these definitions share common 
grounds stemming from Webster’s explanation that emphasizes two traits, i.e., the groups within 
group and the excludability. Zariski (1960, p.33) tends to equate factions to intra-party clique—
that is, groupings that consist of members who are organized to act collectively based on senses 
of common purpose and identity. Belloni (1978, p.419) defined faction as “any relatively 
organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which competes with 
rivals for power advantages within the larger group it is a part of”. This definition was drawn, in 
part from Kollner and Basedau’s understanding that factionalism “does not assume the necessity 
of certain cultural dispositions as some other definitions do” (2005). The ideal faction definition 
must be the opposite of what Kollner’s and Basedau’s predilection, for successful comparison of 
two oriental factionalisms cannot be fulfilled if the conceptual basis faction has no cultural 
linkages. Therefore, I opt to use Hungtington’s perspective that factions are seen as peculiarities 
owned by polities that are in early stages of modernization process where albeit groups and 
individuals have departed from conventional patterns of political behaviors and begun 
institutionalization, yet the extent of political institutionalization is still low (1968, p.412-15). This 
connotation of faction fits well into both China’s and Taiwan’s political realities, as it retains 
certain political space for cultural factor to play. Traditionally, the two polities are both Confucian 
societies where political networks built upon cultural norms such as clientelism and guanxi. 
Furthermore, neither of the two polities has developed into a fully-fledged political system 
despite the fact that both of the two remain a relatively stable political scene for roughly three 
decades (if calculations start from 1989 for China and 1987 the year when the marshal law was 
abolished). China is essentially an authoritarian regime and party politics of Taiwan is fraught 
with deviations comparing with other highly-democratic countries. For example, Chen (2006) 
noted that in Taiwanese politics, identity recognition is more important than good public policies, 
and personal bounds are based on sensibility rather than rationality. Taiwanese democracy also 




as opposed to partisan differences in the West, which are often resolved by means of 
negotiation (Zaobao 2009).   
     The Chinese factional heritage is derived from Pengdang (translated as Friend Faction), 
which comprises of two separate Chinese characters according to Ancient Chinese Dictionary 
Peng and Dang. Peng means, a) friends and b) forming political groups; Dang was used to 
represent political cliques (see, Ancient Chinese Dictionary Online). Over thousands of years of 
feudalist history, Pengdang was adopted to represent factional activities in the court politics. Out 
of many ancient Chinese political works, the most famous would be Pengdang Lun (On the 
Partisanship of Friends Party) by Ou-Yang Xiu (1007–22 September 1072 CE) in which Ou-
Yang, in order to lessen emperor’s suspicion over factions in the court, justified the existence of 
factions by differentiating the virtuous factions from the vicious ones. Pengdang was viewed as a 
major political threat to emperors in most of Chinese dynasties (Yang 1997；Lü 2013；Zeng 
2010). Mao inherited this mentality from his imperatorial predecessors. Terms that contain strong 
negative connotations such as Quanzi (circle), Shantou (mountaintop), Bangpai (gang) were 
often used by Mao to represent his political enemies. What is noteworthy is that there are 
apparent differences between Chinese traditional Pengdang and western factions in the political 
science context. Zhu and Chen (1992, p.3) noted that Pengdang was merely surreptitious 
coalitions of feudalistic lords, and included no modernistic factional characteristics such as 
official regulations, organizations, rights and responsibilities of members. 
2.2 Previous Theoretical Framework Revisited 
     The following factionalism theoretical findings are mostly stemmed from studies on the CCP 
factions. I tentatively extend these findings to the DPP case, despite the fact that it has been 
operating in a democratic political system for nearly four decades. In other words, theoretical 
framework of factionalism of the two research subjects are premised on that the CCP factional 
traits are contingently applicable to the DPP. Behind this generalization are two justifications.  
First and foremost, the most convincing support comes from Shi Tianjian’s conclusion that 
despite mainland China and Taiwan having been politically isolated from each other for more 
than one century, their political cultures in terms of Orientation Towards Authority (OTA) and 
Definition of Self-interest (DSI) remained almost in congruence until 2004 (2004, p.68); both 
OTA and DSI are closely related to the high politics studies as OTA can be seen as a vital 
indicator of the relationship between leader and subordinates and DSI defines how one view 
his/her interests in the collective social or political group he/she belongs to. The second 
justification is that  the existing factionalism studies on the DPP are not as rich as that on the 
CCP, and their theoretical basis converge with studies on the CCP factionalism in terms of 




2010; Hsieh 2013). In order to avoid the incompatibilities caused by different political 
environments, formulating structures, and political ambitions of the two parties, I will issue 
disclaimer whenever the findings are exclusive to only one party. 
     Nathan’s (1973) factionalism model for the CCP politics derived from the clientelist ties which 
particularly referred to “an exchange relationship of a limited and specific kind”. According to his 
argument, political conflict is inclined to be organized through clintelist ties rather than corporate 
lineage units or formal organizations. Based upon this premise, participants of political conflict 
may either become power brokers and formulate mass political organizations or mobilize their 
networks that contains only one or a few layers of networks. Those mobilized networks 
constitute a faction in which relationships between leaders and followers are characterized by 
one-to-one linkages instead of corporatism. Nathan proposed 15 characteristics to factional 
politics, including a code of civility, doctrinarism, legitimacy taboo, and immobilism of factional 
systems. These 15 traits were not all identified at the time when this model was constructed in 
the early 1970s. Tang (1995) noted that this model’s incapability of fully cover the CCP’s 
factional phenomena was essentially related to Nathan’s principal thesis that factions in a given 
arena will end up with relative power equalities. In addition, Nathan’s observation was restricted 
to the high politics and factional violence that contradicts his code of civility characterization 
including death sentences and torture in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. 
     Contrary to the power equality theory from Nathan, Tang (1995) held that factional struggles 
between Chinese communist elites is a zero-sum game, noting that “the struggle for power 
among the Chinese elites, involving either supreme political power or power one level below, 
always involves one side winning all and/or the other side.” In his argument, Tang uses 
numerous examples from the history of the CCP. Dittmer and Wu (1995) argued that 
factionalism, as a form of informal politics, is of supplementary to formal politics within Chinese 
political system. Factions, as informal politics come into play when formal politics fail to deliver 
interests to factional members. In informal politics it is Shili that is built on value-rational 
networks that exerts influence; whereas quanli (referring to power associating with official 
positions) has the final say in formal politics. Nathan (1995), later, devised a typology in which 
the CCP was classified as agreement-based and hierarchical party whereas the DPP was 
classified as exchange-based and segmentary party according to four associating bases and 
four coordinative communication patterns. Taking essence and discarding dregs of Tang’s 
“winners-takes-all” theory and Goldstein’s (1991) “bandwagon” and “balance of power” models, 
Bo (2007) devised the “power balancing” model that is entrusted to have more elucidative power 
on the 21st century Chinese elitist politics. Bo’s power balancing theory (which stems from 
Tang’s hierarchical structure and critique of Goldstein’s take of CR political struggles as a form 
of balancing) argues that Chinese elite politics has turned more institutionalized where the 




winners were permitted to exist. These are all premised on a fact that functional differentiation 
has widened. 
     In terms of the function of faction, scholars (Pye 1980; Nathan 1995; Kollner and Basedau 
2005) hold various opinions. According to Nathan’s revised factionalism model, there are four 
functions of factions in a hierarchical order: the top priority being security, material interests, and 
then policy preferences and ideological considerations. However, Pye did not ascribe as much 
importance to policy issues, bureaucratic interests, or ideological considerations as to security 
(1980, p.vi). Deng Xiaoping’s resultant institutionalization and legalization of Chinese elitist 
politics reduced security importance; economic reform increased factional interests towards 
policy orientations.  Kollner and Basedau’s take on the factional functions is more applicable to 
the DPP factions. The functions of factions can be: 1) distributive: allocation of electoral goodies 
such as posts; 2) representative: representing ethical groups, unions, etc.;3) articulative: 
mediation of ideologies and political issues (Kollner and Basedau 2005). 
     In Taiwan, factionalism, for a long period of time, was exclusively used to represent the 
KMT’s cozy relationship with local elites in Taiwan. Due to this, people tend to hold the viewpoint 
that the DPP factionalism also represents the patron-client connection between party elitists and 
grass-roots, but that is not the case.  As noted earlier, the DPP was born from the coalescing of 
different activist groups that consisted of writers and editors as well as local cadres prior to 
democratization era (or when Taiwan was under the martial law). Understandably, factions are 
regarded as relationships formulated between these elitist activists within the DPP. 
Consequently, in the initial stage the relations between the DPP factions were rather cooperative 
and on equal terms. The other aspects of the DPP factionalism are very similar with those of the 
CCP except for its function and goals. The priority of the DPP factions is not seeking security—
after all, they are overt sub-party organizations with some of them even holding administrative 
offices, staffs and rules. Rather, their priority is to win elections. Without rewarding factional 
members with electoral interests continuously, factions lose materialistic foundation of existence. 
      Chen (1995 p.36-43) built the Factional Stability and Change theory drawing upon coalition-
building theory to explain the DPP’s factional phenomena. According to Chen, there are three 
types of factional configurations: 1) the extremely imbalanced structure referring to the situation 
in which only two equal factions co-exist; 2) the fragile balanced structure represents a delicate 
situation that consists of two almost equally powerful factions and other small weak factions in 
which anyone’s subtle move would easily cause disruption of such balance; 3) and the balanced 
structure in which exists an overwhelmingly dominant faction and no faction possesses the 
strengths to challenge it. Wu (2008) reminded us the convenience of using political scientific 
tools to analyze the DPP factionalism. Specifically, he raises the contradiction between collective 
interests of factions and leaders’ personal interest. Peng (2010, p.22) adopted Mobilization of 




that the patterns of interest distribution are inclined to “bias” from within institutions. Owing to the 
then unique political circumstances, Hsieh (2013, p.46) formulated the so-called Factional 
Realignment under President theory (or Zongtong Zhudao Xia De Paixi Chongzu ), which by 
nature was a reflection of power centralization centering around president during the Chen Shui-
bian era. It is widely agreed that Chen Shui-bian’s successful breaking through of the factional 
entanglement was by virtue of Party-led Governance (Yi Dang Ling Zheng), which was enabled 
by making president simultaneous the party boss of the DPP. The significance of Party-led 
Governance is that it empowers incumbent president to push through favorable policies or laws 
in the Legislative Yuan by uniting the DPP legislators with the rich political clout granted by 
his/her party boss position (See, Chen 2012, p.110-112; Hseih p.47). Party-led Governance has 
become a common practice in Taiwan party politics. Chen Shui-bian’s successor, Ma Ying-jeou 
also resorted to it when he experienced great immobility from the KMT legislators at the 
Legislative Yuan. Now, albeit being criticized having broken her promise, Tsai has remained as 
party boss of the DPP since being elected. 
      Building upon the research above, I wish to compare high politics between the CCP and the 
DPP using factionalism as the perspective. Factionalism, in this thesis, comes with a heavy dose 
of Chinese characteristics including the Chinese type of clintelist ties or guanxi, as well as 
participants’ attitudes towards OTA and DSI. Furthermore, by taking the forms of political 
struggles and cooperation, it ultimately illuminates the dilemma of factional members when 
facing the choice between collectivism and individualism. If the current factional configuration of 
the CCP and the DPP have to be subsumed into a tree structure, then the former is in a 
hierarchy order and the latter is in an anarchic organizational fashion. The CCP politics has 
achieved a decent-degree of institutionalization since Deng’s reform. Specifically, superiority in 
bureaucratic hierarchy has attained sufficient deference, factional conflicts have been confined 
within the code of civility, and power succession norms remained efficient as before Xi ’s 
altercation. Xi has proven to be a disturber of the status quo after one term in charge. His anti-
corruption campaign has swept all non-Xi factions under the rug; and the ad hoc commissions 
and military reform has further consolidated his power. However, factions are far from having 
been eliminated, instead they operate in a dormant fashion. As to the DPP, after Tsai Ing-wen 
restored the presidency on behalf of DPP in 2016, DPP factions have ushered in another quasi-
Chen Shui-bian concordances. Correspondingly, Tsai is permitted to alter factional equilibrium 
using her political knacks and the rich electoral resources at her disposal. The Party-led 




3. A Comparison Theory  
3.1 Outline of Two Systems     
      I argue that under the same cultural norms, factionalism in a closed political entity such as 
the one-party state would cause legitimacy erosion of the ruling party, which eventually leads to 
a vicious circle rotating between power dispersion and power centralization, until the dangling 
legitimacy disappears. In stark contrast, in open political entities such as democratic parties, 
factionalism tends to function as a kind of social Darwinist device, i.e. an organic way of power 
aggregation and dispersion which eventually results in the selection of the fittest (or the most 
powerful). 
     The cultural congruence in the comparison theory makes sure that the factionalism under 
scrutiny connotes the same elements. In this case, it would be the way based on which political 
actioners link with one another, which can be guanxi-based including shared school, work or 
inhabitation experiences, or interest-based that consists of patron-client relationships. The one-
party state excludes any contestants who do not belong to the party, which creates the political 
arena for factionalism to play (i.e. intra-party competition). Barring the extreme incidents such as 
an invasion from outside or an insurrection from within, the intra-party competitions have great 
latitude to test its boundaries. Such a premise constitutes the best gauging field for Tang Tsou’s 
(1995) “winner-takes-all” observation, for whoever intends to win the factional conflicts would 
have to defeat the rest of all rivals completely. Either due to the morality constrain that leads to 
power hand-down, or that the ruling legitimacy has been too devastated by intra-party 
competition, the dominants have to cede power to others in order to salvage the crippling 
legitimacy. Consequently, power is factionalized dispersing to a number of political elites. As the 
ruling legitimacy goes back to upward, the intra-party competition resurfaced fiercely. That 
propels the strong leader to recentralize the dispersed power. Up to this, a complete cycle of 
power dispersion and power centralization takes place. This rotation repeats itself until the 
legitimacy goes oblivious owing to both the devastation from intra-party conflicts and societal 
and economic reforms that the ruling party has to initiate, ironically, in order to salvage the down-
falling legitimacy.  
Arguably, factionalism in democratic party politics acts as a kind of mechanism of Natural 
Selection. In order to win elections, parties are forced to compete with the rest of the parties on 
critical issues that are of great interests to the voters. The know-hows would come up with 
effective policies and make the most of the rules by coalescing with other powerful figures in the 
intra-party and national election, or legislature election. Such political maneuvers would not be 




Eventually, a mutual-facilitating relation is established between factionalism and democratization, 
meaning the democratic arrangement provides factions an arena to conduct Natural Selection 
through factional conflicts and cooperation, in return, the actions and rhetoric of the fittest 
brought about by Natural Selection would reinforce the democratic arrangement. 
3.2 Methods of Comparison 
Based on the argument above mentioned, the weight of this comparison will be put on 
how factionalism respectively influence the two parties’ political performance. In another 
words, I wish to demonstrate the argument that factionalism functions as a positive force for 
the DPP and a negative force for the CCP. I adopt a historiographical review approach. By 
briefly reviewing two party histories that will be divided into respective three stages 
according to specific milestones in the party politics, I will present a fluid and no less detailed 
factionalism-influencing-party-performance analysis. Hence, the comparison would have 
more possibility to be a rigorous one.  
Throughout the comparison, other important elements of factionalism such as the types 
of factions (whether one faction is institutionalized or not), structure of factions, and 
robustness of factions will also be included. However, these elements are not going to be the 
key focus of this thesis. For one, their existences are to serve the demonstration of the 
argument. I have no intention to accomplish an in-depth investigation on a very complex 
subject which is worthy the volume of a comprehensive monograph with a MA thesis. And 
two, some of these elements are too elusive to be analyzed, for example, scientifically, one 
cannot conduct a thorough comparison on the institutionalization of the two sets of factions if 





















4. Types of Factions 
Throughout this thesis, factions will be primarily categorized into different types according to 
the extent of institutionalization. As noted above, all of the CCP factions are non-institutionalized 
political groups which do not have official offices, rules and responsibilities and their members 
remaining rather too obscure to be discerned. The types of factions of the DPP are more 
diversified than those from the CCP, some of them are highly institutionalized such as the New 
Tide faction (Xin Chaoliu), the Justice League faction (Zhengyi Lianxian), the Fuliguo faction. 
Others are moderately institutionalized, for instance, the Meilidao faction, and the Mainstream 
faction (Zhu Liu Lianmeng) and some are minimally institutionalized, such as the Tsai faction, 
which is merely a symbolic term for the united DPP with Tsai Ing-wen being the party boss. The 
following factions are to be analyzed in different chapters throughout this thesis. 
 
         Faction 
Party 
 Institutionalized Non-institutionalized 
CCP X √ 
DPP √ √ 
	
Table	1	shows	the	extent	of	institutionalization	of	factions	as	seen	in	the	CCP	and	DPP.	
4.1 Non-institutionalized factions from the CCP 
 
         Name of the Faction       Members 
          
          Dootrinairism               Li Lisan, Wang Ming, Bo Gu, the Russian returned students. 
 
          Local Technocrats        Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi. 
 
         Mao faction                  Mao and his allies in different stages. 
          
         Gang of Four               Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao. 
 
         Lin Biao faction            Lin Biao, Ye Qun, Lin Liguo. 
           
Zhong Gong Ba Lao(Eight Senior Politicians)       Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun,     
Li Xiannian, Wan Li, Song Renqiong, Xi Zhongxun(father of Xi  
Jinping). 
 





         Conservative faction     Chen Yun, Li Peng, Deng Liqun. 
 
         Shanghai Gang            Jiang Zemin, Huang Ju, Wu Bangguo, Zhou Yongkang, Chen Liangyu, Zhang Gaoli, Liu       
Yunshan, Zhang Dejiang. 
 
          New Gang of Four        Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Xu Caihou.  
 
          Youth League             Hu Yaobang, Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang. 
 
          Xi Jinping faction        Xi Jinping, Chen Miner, Liu He, Wang Qishan, Chen Xi, Li Zhanshu, Wang Hunin, Cai Qi. 
 
 
4.2 Institutionalized Factions from the DPP 
 
           Name of the Faction                                                              Members 
 
Association of out-of-Party Writers and Editors                      Su Qingli, Zhong Guluo, Lin Zhengjie, Lin Zhuoshui, Qiu  
                                                                                                Yiren, Zhou Bolun, Jiang Pengjian, etc.  
 
Association of out-of-Party Public Servants                        Fei Xiping, Zhou Yuqing, You Qing, Zhang Junxiong, Huang   
                                                                                          Yujiao, Cai Jiexiong, Xie Changting, Chen Jinde, Lin 
Wenlang,  
                                                                                          Kang Ningxiang, Chen Shenhong. 
 
Meilidao Faction                                                                  Huang Xinjie, Zhang Junhong, Xu Xinliang, Xu Rongshu,   
Zhou Bolun, Xu Guotai,Chen wenqian, Chen Shuibian,  
Wang Tuo, Zhang Xueshun, etc.  
 
New Era Institute Faction                                                         Zhang Junhong, Zhou Bolun, Lin Zhongzheng ,  
                                                                                               Lin Zongnan, He Jiale, Lin Wenlang, Liu Junxiong,  
                                                                                              Chen Zhaonan, Cai Renjian, etc. 
 
Action & Vision Faction                                                          Xu Rongshu, Chen Shenghong, Lin Fengxi, Chen  
                                                                                               Zhongxin, Qiu Maonan, Qiu Yiying, Wang Tuo,  
                                                                                               Hong Fuyao, etc. 
 
New Tide Faction                                                                    Qiu Yiren, Hong Qichang, Lin Zhuoshui, Wu Nairen,  
                                                                                                Chen Ju, Duan Yikang, Ong Jinzhu, Su Huanzhi,  
                                                                                               Yang Qiuyu, Li Wenzhong, Lin Xiyao,etc. 
 




                                                                                                Zhipeng, Cai Huanglang, Shen Fuxiong, Luo Wenjia,  
                                                                                                Wang Xuefeng, Cai Qifang, Zheng Guilian, etc. 
 
Fuliguo Faction                                                                     Xie Changting, Yao Jiawen, Zhang Junxiong, Cai  
                                                                                             Tongrong, Su Zhenchang, Ke Jianming, Li Junxiong,  
                                                                                            Lin Yusheng, etc. 
 
World United Formosans for Independence(WUFI)              Li Yingyuan, Chen Tangshan, Wang  
Xingnan, Lin Guofeng, Yan Jinfu,  
 Liang Muyang, etc.  
 
Mainstream League Faction                                                 Cai Tongrong, Xu Rongshu, Shen Fuxiong, You  
                                                                                             Qing, Li Yingyuan, Ke Jianming, etc. 
 
4.3 Non-institutionalized Factions from the DPP 
     Name of the Faction                                                              Members 
 
Tsai Faction                                                                         Tsai Ing-wen, Lin Quan, Su Jiaquan, Lin Junxian,  



















5. Two Brief Factionalism Stories Three Stages 
     The CCP and the DPP share a number of characteristics with their common political 
enemy Kuomintang, including the extent of elitism of the founders and the organizational 
structure. KMT coincidently played the antagonist in both the CCP’s and the DPP’s heroic 
stories, with itself in the former being much more humiliated than in the latter. However, the 
factional comparison between the two poses an exceptionally complicated stance. In this 
chapter, I set out to investigate the differences and commonalities of the two parties. To 
facilitate this comparative approach, I divide both parties’ factional history into three phases. 
In the DPP case, the starting and ending years of the first DPP president Chen Shui-
bian’s tenure serve as the two demarcation lines of the three stages. The primary stage, 
from 1986 to 2000, saw how different out-of-party activists coalesced and formed the DPP, 
intense factional conflicts and cooperation along the way fighting for democracy and 
electoral achievements, and finally how those early factions evolved, metabolized and 
reached a delicate balance. Then, Chen Shui-bian’s tenure of eight years, from 2000 to 2008, 
marks the second stage. During this period of time, Chen’s Justice League faction (Zhengyi 
Lianxian) outweighed the rest of factions owing to the enormous amount of political 
resources brought about by both his presidential victory and his serving simultaneously as 
the party boss. Lastly, the third stage of the DPP’s factional movement starts from after 2008 
up to now. In the last stage, the factional movements experienced reshuffling and 
reformation along with the DPP’s stinging loss and eventual restoration of power (Chen, 
2011).  
Generally speaking, the CCP’s factional narrative also has three distinct stages with two 
demarcation lines falling at the significant milestones of the party history. Namely, the 
Yan’an Round table in 1943 when Mao achieved complete dominance, and the 
commencement of Reform and Opening up in 1978 under Deng’s watch. 
      Until Mao became the supreme leader of the CCP in 1943 when he attained the title of 
Chairman of Politburo, the CCP’s revolutionary journey was fraught with intense factional 
conflict. This period, from 1921 to 1943, will be classified as the first stage of the CCP’s 
factional history. The second period is relatively longer than the first extending from 1943 to 
1978. This period consists of two significant events from factionalism point of view, the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the breaking-out of the 
disastrous Cultural Revolution. Between 1943 to 1957, the factional struggles were nearly 
non-exist given the incremental authority that Mao had garnered from the successful 
revolution and the fact that the political agenda of the CCP was preoccupied with 




reemerged as seen in a series of social campaigns and intra-party struggles, such as the 
Gao-Rao incident, the purge of General Peng Dehuai, and the chaotic CR. Particularly, the 
CR which lasts from 1966 to 1976 was the most catastrophic episode among all of the CCP 
factional struggles. Academia generally agrees that it was a period of anarchy, confusion 
and vicious fighting instigated by Mao. Pyn (1986) noted that “so much at that time defies 
conventional theory of politics”. whereas, Fairbank (1992, p.372) held that some of the 
factional fighting tactics from this time find origins in early Yan’an period. However, its 
complexity and scale exceed the scope of this thesis. Even till today research on the CR 
continues.  
     The third period started from 1978 when Deng Xiaoping launched the reform initiatives. 
As the Reform and Opening up unfolded, Chinese politics began the process of 
institutionalization in which rule-by-law and authority of institutions and bureaucracies were 
credited much more weight. Factional conflicts revolving around the issue of leadership 
selection was effectively contained due to the institutionalization of succession, as seen in 
the two consecutive smooth power transitions up to 2012. But that did not mean factional 
struggles were completely eliminated, rather, the situation intra-party struggles reached a 
state in which different factions kept a delicate balance in which the supreme leader was 
comparatively weak in the center. Consequently, CCP managed to maintain a harmonious 
picture at least from the outlook. Until recently, Xi Jinping unexpectedly played as the 
disrupter of factional balance. By adopting an anti-corruption campaign, institutional reform 
as well as tightening his grip on the military, he nearly uprooted all non-Xi factions. Today, 
referring to the CCP as a party of Xi would not meet much disagreement.  
5.1 Stage One: Soviets Meddling vs. Striving for Power 
Balance 
This chapter sets out to present two early factional stories of the DPP and the CCP. 
Embedded in two short stories are: the origins and demographics of factions, the way different 
factions operated, the construction of party rules and institutions, respective factional conflicts 
and cooperation, etc. By comparing factionalism of the two parties, I argue that early struggles of 
the CCP factions were dominated by exogenous force, i.e., the Communist International 
(Comintern), whereas, the DPP factions were confined within endogenous parameter with each 
faction probing for the best electoral formula, be it the rules of candidacy nomination for elections 
or the evolution of the DPP’s Taiwan Independence policy, in order to gain more political 
interests.  
The factional story of the DPP started from the out-of-party period when Taiwan was still 




education levels of public increased steadily. It is only a matter of time before young Taiwanese 
started to demand more political rights, especially because they were forced to a dead end on 
the way of climbing social ladders when the retreated KMT elitists formed an alliance on the very 
top which denied any outsiders from entering (Chen 2012 p.22-32). Internationally, Taiwanese 
government was facing a domino type of isolation losing its diplomatic relations one by one, 
which further jeopardized its dangling legitimacy. Owing to that, a series of anti-establishment 
social conflicts broke out between the KMT government and political activists, which includes the 
Zhongli Incident1, the Meilidao Incident. These bloodshed incidents led the strategy of Taiwan 
democratization transformed from an election one to the one that was largely characterized by 
protests and strikes (Chen, 2011). Along the way fighting for democracy, different dissent groups 
naturally joined together by enacting rules and institutions and so on. Eventually, in 1986 
multiple out-of-party activist groups including the relatives of Meilidao Incident victims, the 
lawyers of Meilidao Incidents, BianLianHui ( Association of out-of-Party Writers and Editors ), 
and GongZhengHui (out-of-Party Officials Association for Public Policy), coalesced together and 
formed the DPP. These early members of the DPP were unanimously well-educated holding 
bachelors degree or even masters degree, some of them were lawyers and others were political 
commentators. In other words, the DPP was initially an elitist party.  
Similarly, the early CCP members also came from the higher echelon of Chinese society. As 
shown in Table 2, all of the 13 party representatives in the first Party Congress held college 
degrees, and some even went to the best universities in China and Japan. 

























                                               
1 Zhongli Incident was a riot in the Taiwanese town of Zhongli (now Zhongli District, Taoyuan City) in 1977, after 






Name Locality  Age  School of graduate or drop-out 
 Li Da  Hunan  31  Imperial University of Japan 
 Li Hanjun  Hubei  31  Imperial University of Japan 
Dong Biwu  Hubei  35  Nihon University  
 Zhou Fuhai  Hunan  24   First Higher School, Japan 
 Chen Gongbo  Guangdong  29  Columbia University  
 Zhang Guotao  Jiangxi  24  Peking University  
 Liu Renjing Hubei  19  Peking University 
 Chen Tanqiu  Hubei  25 National Wuchang Normal University 
 Mao Zedong Hunan  28  Hunan No.1 Normal College 
 He Shuheng  Hunan  45  Hunan No.4 Normal College 
 Wang Jinmei  Shandong  23  Shandong No.1 Normal College 
 Bao Huiseng  Hubei  27  Hubei No.1 Normal College 
 Deng Enming  Guizhou  20  Shandong No.1 High School 
                            Source: Website of the Communist Party of China（http://cpc.people.com.cn/）. 
Table	2	Education	details	of	the	first	CCP	Party	Congress	representatives	
 
     Yet, contrary to the nearly natural birth of the DPP, the establishment of the CCP was 
under direct instruction of an exogenous influence, namely, the Comintern (See, History of 
the Chinese Communist Party p.40). There were many regional communist organizations 
before the CCP was declared established, however none of them qualified as a party, let 
alone the existence of factions. Mao’s main rival, the Russian returned students would only 
be sent to Moscow Sun Yat-sen University in a later stage. These students formed various 
factions at different stages that seek to dominate the party in terms of revolution strategy and 
ideological doctrine. 
5.1.1 Factions of the DPP: Cooperation & Contestation 
     Chen argues that the reason that the DPP is not inclined to splinter is due to its robust 
structure (2012, p. 66). Although intra-party democracy was the principle of the DPP since the 
first day, the DPP also copied a series of hierarchical institutions and operation rules from the 
KMT when formed. For example, the DPP adopted the Central Executive Committee (CEC) 
institution, which holds supreme authority of the DPP. Currently, CEC has 35 members; fighting 
for the dominant presence in CEC is an important item on each faction’s agenda. Then, out of 




Moreover, the party central has absolute authority over party subdivisions. In spite of being a 
rigid party, the DPP also has multiple characteristics of electoral party, as seen in prioritizing 
gaining more votes so as to win elections as opposed to recruiting a large number of party 
members (Chen 2012, 68). In the initial stage of the DPP’s factional activities, despite the fact 
that factions diverged on a number of critical issues, they reached a delicate factional balance 
which served the party well to compete against the KMT as the times went by. 
     Intra-party struggle in the DPP was revolved around factions; power transition is reflected by 
ups and downs of certain factions. Lin (2002, 76) tends to classify factions in the DPP as the 
institutionalized faction, meaning that factions are built upon the spirit of equality, impersonal and 
operate within formal regulation parameters. Until 1986, the KMT had been ruling Taiwan for 
approximately three decades. What the newly-formed DPP faced was a formidable enemy. Early 
factions had to join together to compete in the elections against the powerful KMT regime. Sun 
(2003, 222-223) added that constant local elections made it inevitable for these political dissents 
to eventually build a party machine. Because elections demanded the capabilities of organizing, 
fund-raising, and strategic planning out of anti-establishment political dissents. Individually, these 
out-of-party activists are feeble, therefore, they have to coalesce and coordinate with each other. 
As a consequence, institutions and rules were developed and modified in order to achieve better 
electoral results. In the early days, due to the coercive political environment caused by the 
Meilidao Incident and that the leading figures of the Meilidao Incident were sentenced to jail for 
many years, Kang Ningxiang who came from within the establishment with a title of Taipei 
lawmaker, was able to hold the party helm by opting for a moderate strategy, i.e., taking power 
by winning elections. Kang faction garnered 9 seats out of 31 CEC seats and 5 seats out of 11 
CSC seats in the first All Party Member Congress. But the factional conflict in the early DPP 
quickly became a dual-play between the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction after the 
release of the Meilidao Incident leaders. Kang faction swiftly petered out the intra-party struggle 
scene (Chen, 2011). 
     The Meilidao faction was a faction that is comprised of direct participants, relatives and 
lawyers of the participants. Its early members includes Huang Xinjie, Zhang Junhong, Xu 
Xinliang, Xu Rongshu (Zhang Junhong’s ex-wife), Chen Shuibian,etc. Many held legislative 
positions before the Melidao Incident, for instances, Xu Xinjiang and Zhang Junhong were KMT 
members before joining the DPP and both were provincial lawmakers. Xu Rongshu’s and Chen 
Shui-bian’s early sacrifice paved their ways for legislative positions in a later stage. This faction 
is considered as the less revolutionary division or a political group who preferred election 
strategy than social movement strategy. The main rival of the Melidao faction, the New Tide 
faction, was originated from The Movement magazine that was co-edited by Wu Nairen, Qiu 
Yiren, Lin Zhuoshui, Hong Qichang, etc. Disgusted by the DPP’s chronicle moderate strategy 




factional protectionism, the New Tide claimed to draw a clear demarcation line from the vested 
interests groups and started over a brand new opposition campaign by resorting to a strategy 
that mixes both election and social movements (see, Zheng’s dissertation 2004, 307-309). 
     In the first few years of the DPP, the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction diverged on a 
number of key issues. First, Taiwan independence and democratizing Taiwan, which comes first? 
Chen (1990, p.85) defined this issue as the debate between nationalism strategy and 
democratization strategy. On the one hand, Yao Jiawen, a key member from the New Tide 
faction spearheaded the nationalism strategy. Analyzing the then Taiwan’s geopolitical ambience, 
Yao identified that the KMT’s persistence of reclaiming mainland China as the biggest obstacle 
of Taiwan democratization. “Without an independent Taiwan, KMT will always hold onto such an 
illusion, hence, it would be impossible for the KMT to lift the martial law and abolish the ‘Eternal 
Congress’” or Wan Nian Guo Hui2. Therefore, Taiwan democratization would never be fulfilled. 
(Yao 1988, 152-162). On the other hand, Zhang Junhong from the Meilidao  faction cautioned 
that despite he agreed that Taiwan should be an independent country, yet, adopting an 
aggressive Taiwan independence strategy could very likely 1) decrease the size of constituency 
that support the call for Taiwan democratization and 2) result in more war threats from CCP 3) 
and lead to more repression from the KMT regime. 
     Second, social movements strategy or election strategy? The Meilidao faction iterated its 
roadmap to Taiwan democracy through Zhang Junhong’s and Lü Yu’s book “A Road to 
Power”(Dao Zhizheng Zhi Lu). As the Meilidao faction imagined it, the DPP should opt for the 
election strategy. Specifically, the book suggested the DPP to tap into the existing conflicts 
between vested interest groups from localities and the KMT central government. When the 
disadvantaged constituents see the DPP attacking the privileges of local vested interest groups, 
they were expected to side with the DPP against central KMT government. Little by little, the 
DPP would build a united front among local governments by defeating the KMT’s local clients in 
local elections. It would be only a matter of time before the KMT to be stripped off power. Such a 
strategy was termed as “Local Encircling Central” (Di Fang Bao Wei Zhong Yang) by Zhang and 
Lü (1989, 12), which bizarrely resembles Mao’s “Rural Encircling Cities”(Nong Cun Bao Wei 
Cheng Shi) in the revolution time. To this idea, the New Tide faction rebutted that the Meilidao 
faction overlooked the long-existing rigid patron-client bound between central KMT government 
and local factions. The New Tide insisted that the road to power shall be a way filled with social 
movements in which as many citizens as possible to be mobilized. Further, the New Tide faction 
was rather pessimistic about the prospective result of “Local Encircling Central” strategy, it held 
that local politics were already factionalized. What would follow after the uprooting of previous 
                                               
2 Wan Nian Guo Hui represents the first batch congressmen elected since KMT government retreat to Taiwan, 




vested interest groups is only another batch of vested interest groups. The old entrenched 
interest distribution mechanism will remain intact. 
     Such disagreements would slowly resolve by itself in the 1990s as the number of elections 
increased. The Meilidao faction would consequently take the first lead in this early factional 
conflict. Zheng(p.178) pointed out that the majority of elites from the DPP began to realize that 
election strategy was more realistic as time goes by. The effectiveness of election strategy is 
buttressed by two supportive facts. One, under the leadership of Xu Xinliang who was a 
steadfast pro-election strategy figure, the DPP’s approval rate rose steadily. The DPP received 
33.1% of all votes and 1/3 of all seats in Legislative Yuan election in 1992; in 1993 provincial 
election the DPP garnered 41.2% of all votes, only 6 point less than the KMT, which created the 
best approval rate record for the DPP (Xia,1999, p.194-250). Two, as a critical indicator of power 
configuration of different factions the transformation of CSC seats would further reinforce the 
importance of the election strategy. Based on Guo’s (1997 P.206) analysis, the percentage of 
CSC seats holder who also occupied public offices increased from 6/11 in 1989, to 7/11 in 1991, 
to 8/11 in 1993. That means election played an increasingly important role when it comes to the 
generation of new political elites in the DPP. Nevertheless, the New Tide faction managed to 
squeeze the Meilidao faction’s power space by tapping into the Taiwan independence issue 
when the latter was winning the strategic debate. 
     The political environment turned permissive in the early 1990s when the then president Li 
Denghui terminated the martial law, was legalized the formation of party organizations. 
Under such circumstances, the New Tide faction launched a series of initiatives that 
propelled the DPP for an immediate transition on its Taiwan independence policy. The New 
Tide faction nearly chartered the Taiwan independence clause to the Party Constitution of 
the DPP in the 7th Plenary Session of the First Central Committee; the passage of “4.17 
Resolution” further consolidated the DPP’s ground towards Taiwan independence in 1988. 
Taiwan independence topic proved to be rather handy for the New Tide faction to alter the 
disadvantaged factional bout with the Meilidao faction, which was evidenced in the CEC and 
CSC elections that ensued respectively in October and November 1991. Table 3 shows the 
nearly equal presence of the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction since 1988 shifted to 

















Year Meilidao New Tide Justice League Fuliguo Others Total Party Boss 
1986 0.00 0.45 non-exist non-exist 0.55 1.00 non-exist 
1987 0.25 0.17 non-exist non-exist 0.58 1.00 New Tide 
1988 0.55 0.45 non-exist non-exist 0.00 1.00 Meilidao 
1989 0.55 0.45 non-exist non-exist 0.00 1.00 Meilidao 




     Table 3 demonstrates that the Meilidao faction held the majority of CSC seats in 1988 
and 1989, the rest of the CSC seats were occupied by the New Tide faction. But the 
situation developed towards the favor of the New Tide faction, with its CSC seats 
exceedingly surpass those of the Meilidao faction. 
     Deeply concerned with its power shrinking, the Meilidao faction chose to side with the New 
Tide faction on Taiwan independence issue. As a result, Taiwan independence clause was 
eventually enlisted on Party Constitution on November 13th, 1991 without encountering much 
resistance, which officially declared the DPP a pro-Taiwan independence party. Unexpectedly, 
the agreement on Taiwan independence issue was not welcomed by the public. The DPP merely 
reaped 66 seats out of 325 legislator seats with a record-low approval rate, only 23.9 % in the 
second Legislative Yuan election in the end of 1991. Chen (2012, p.92) believed the DPP’s 
landslide defeat was owing to its campaign strategy that is centered on building a Taiwan 
sovereign. 
     The New Tide faction exerted high-extent of adaptability shifting its aggressive Taiwan 
independence policy to a practical one. That propelled the DPP to adopt a practical Taiwan 
independence policy. What is worth adding is that even though the DPP is praised for its 
structural robustness and not prone to splitter, party splitting nevertheless occurred two times as 
a direct result of extremely different opinions on Taiwan independence issue. Lin Zhengjie who is 
dedicated to the idea that Taiwan needs to unite with mainland China renounced himself from 
the DPP in 1991, and rejoined the KMT in 2016. Quite surprisingly, a number of adamant pro-
Taiwan independence party members also quit the DPP and established the Taiwan 
Independence Party (TIP) in 2015 because they were unsatisfied seeing the DPP’s derailing 
from Taiwan independence track. 
     The dual-play factional bout between the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction would be 
disrupted when the Justice League faction and the Fuliguo League faction were formed in 1992. 




consisted of official office, regular meetings, prioritizing factional resolution over party policies. In 
addition, a few other factions, such as the Taiwan Independence Alliance faction, the 
Mainstream Alliance faction and the New Momentum faction were also established around the 
same time; the DPP factional story entered a new chapter that was heavily diversified. Chen 
(2012, p.85) noted that the generation of the DPP elites relied on two approaches: a) those who 
already have political assets at their disposal keep cashing out by taking advantage of the 
existing interests distribution mechanism; b) political newcomers were not left without options, 
instead, they could break into the core circle with audacious political endeavors, be it challenging 
the incumbent factional leaders or campaigning with policies that were attracted to wider 
constituents. Chen Shui-bian is one of the most strategic newcomers. Although Chen Shui-bian 
made his name in Meilidao Incident as a civil rights lawyer, his political career started slower 
than his peers. However, he would catch up and even lead the cohort in this period of time. 
     Chen Shui-bian defeat his life-long friend and rival Xie Changting winning the right to 
participate in 1994 Taipei mayor election. His successful election as Taipei mayor boosted his 
prestige in the DPP. When Xu Xinliang landed the second time on the party boss position after a 
humiliated defeat in the 1996 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian did not hesitate to attack Xu 
and the Meilidao faction behind him. Chen’s Justice League faction diverged on a number of 
issues including Taiwan identity, party cooperation, and the constitution revision with the 
Meilidao faction. In 1997, Chen Shui-bian moved one step further. The Justice Leaguge faction 
and the Fuliguo faction launched a “coup” against party central and forced it to tear apart the 
pre-signed constitutional reform deal with the KMT (Xu 2003, p.172). Moreover, Chen Shui-bian 
formed an alliance with the New Tide faction on Taiwan independence issue, which eventually 
pressed Xu Xinliang to withdraw from party boss election in 1998. The more aggressive 
initiatives Chen Shui-bian launched, the more political gains he would reap. As Chen Shui-bian 
become the first DPP president by winning 2000 election, the factional configuration entered the 
second stage in which the hard-earned factional balance was disrupted. I will address it in next 
chapter. 
5.1.2 Early Factions in CCP: the Comintern Manipulation v.s. Local 
Political Elites 
     Unlike factions in the DPP, the CCP factions are far from institutionalized organizations, their 
existence was strictly forbidden by Comintern which acted as the paramount patron of the CCP 
in the early stage. Political group is more precise than faction to describe these factions. 
Members joining together may have happened out of the typical guanxi-based linkages, for 
instance, they may have come from same localities, went to the same school or were colleagues 




     In this stage, there were mainly three critical factions, the Doctrinairism faction, the local 
bureaucrat faction and the Mao faction. The Doctrinairism faction was comprised of students 
who had come back from Russia, its members included yet not exhaustive, the prominent 
twenty-eight and half Bolsheviks, Liu Bocheng, Liu Shaoqi, Ye Jianying. Members from this 
faction held orthodox authority due to their educational background and support from Moscow, 
indeed, they were also assigned critical responsibilities by Comintern. The Doctrinairism faction 
later become the biggest opponent of the Mao faction. Local Bureaucrats faction represents the 
prestigious party seniors whose career took off rather early and whose influence persisted 
regardless of the political environment, such as Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying, etc. Mao spearheaded 
his own faction. Depending on his actual political goals, his faction members would be constantly 
in flux. As noted above, the CCP factions were not institutionalized, they were at most unofficial 
cliques that would form and disband as the factional struggles move along. Therefore, the 
members of the CCP factions were not fixed, rather, they were inclined to change.   
     The CCP grew rapidly during the first CCP-KMT cooperation (1923-1927), which alerted the 
KMT. Chiang Kai-shek ripped this cooperation apart and the KMT turned against the CCP 
viciously hunting down its members in 1927. The following civil wars between Chiang Kai-shek, 
Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xi-shan created an illusion on the CCP key leaders’ mind that if they 
could take a few weak fort cities domino effect would be triggered and more cities would fall, 
China would be taken over in the end. 
     Firmly obsessed with this illusion, the incumbent leader Li Lisan resorted to what Comintern 
called an adventurism route. Li Lisan and his close comrades were determined to overtake the 
KMT-ruled China by military action. In order to achieve this goal, they even conspired to subvert 
Manchuria so as to drag the Soviet Union into the war against the imperial Japanese army (Yang, 
2005 & Gao, 2000, 19) which they regarded as the critical obstacle of building a communist 
China. The Oriental Bureau of Comintern (OBC) strongly opposed to this idea and ordered that 
revolution should start from rural China. Against the vehement condemnation from Comintern, 
Li-led red army took over Changsha city which boosted their confidence greatly and they began 
defying more orders from Comintern. The CCP embarked on the so-called Lisan Route (LR) 
resolutely. During this time, Wang Ming who had just come back from Moscow Sun Yat-sen 
University firmly believed that his understanding of Leninism was much more profound than Li 
Lisan, and questioned LR route with the support from his close associates who were mostly also 
just returned China from Moscow like him. Li Lisan was agitated by Wang’s defiance. He 
mobilized politburo to punish Wang’s doctrinarism faction (Gao, 2000). 
     This factional conflict would not be put out until the Comintern directly intervened, resulting 
the power erection of Wang Ming on the cost of Li Lisan. On the 4th Plenary Session of 6th Party 
Congress, Wang’s doctrinarism faction was redressed with himself being erected as the member 




in the CCP. In this episode, the CCP’s early factional bout were under the absolute influence of 
exogenous force, the Comintern. To a large extent, the Comintern was directly involved with the 
factional struggle. Nevertheless, despite that Wang Ming had a powerful external supporter, he 
did not lead the CCP to success, on the contrary, and under his even more audacious initiatives 
the CCP’s revolution was severely damaged. In contrast, Mao whose early career base was 
remote from the party central, achieved a series of small triumphs and built both the first troop 
and first territory of the CCP, which gained him early political assets paving his entry into the 
party central. But Wang Ming’s political advancement was supported by the doctrinarism faction 
that was comprised almost unanimously by Russian returned students who indiscriminately 
believed in the Soviet’s experience, namely, the “Rural Encircling Cities”. Most importantly, the 
doctrinarism faction had the firm support from the Comintern. The CCP factional struggle swiftly 
entered into the Wang-Mao phase as party central merged Mao’s army. Later, Mao would defeat 
Wang Ming by exercising his political wits that were characterized by constantly building 
alliances with key political figures based upon his practical needs (See  Gao 2000p.37-40). 
     To pave his way towards the ultimate power, Mao purposefully co-opted Zhang Wentian who 
was a high-level party official belonging to the twenty-eight and half Bolsheviks. Zhang was an 
academic in the CCP who had good connections with Moscow. His pick ensured that no party 
reform would stir up anxiousness within the Comintern. Zhang’s replacement of doctrinairistic Bo 
Gu made him the political leader of the CCP. As Mao reclaimed his sole military authority, Mao-
Zhang faction become the cornerstone of the party politics. Mao would repeat this trick again by 
supporting Liu Shaoqi to attack the Soviet-backed party central in a later stage. Despite viewing 
the Comintern as his major political obstacle, Mao was also well aware of the Soviets’ 
significance in his revolutionary career. The Soviet Union not only loaned Mao a plausible 
ideology which later would be developed into Mao thoughts but also provided war bloodline to 
the CCP by supplying large amount of heavy weaponries (Yang 2010). 
     In the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, the cooperative strategy towards the KMT insisted 
by Wang Ming and Zhou Enlai gained wide support from the party central as well as the 
Comintern. Because Mao was suspicious of the CCP-KMT cooperation, his position was largely 
undermined by Wang Ming. But Mao was clever enough to send Russian returned officials to 
Moscow to win over the Comintern’s favor. As His army grew bigger and powerful, he then won 
back the trust of military commands. In comparison with Mao, Wang Ming was much less adept 
at guanxi building and lacking of power struggle crafts. For example, Mao’s lobbyist Wang 
Jiaxiang was once Wang Ming’s close ally, and yet went to Moscow on behalf of Mao. Gao(2000
p.60) pointed out one of Wang’s most detrimental mistake was that he never had any military 




     Ideology became a vital component of the ultimate leadership in the initial stage of factional 
struggle. When Mao devised Mao Zedong Thoughts based on Sinification of Marxism, he finally 
defeated the Wang Ming faction and assumed the ultimate leadership. Because the CCP was 
formed upon an imported ideology, whoever intended to dominate the party had to obtain the 
exclusive right of interpreting Marxism. In comparison with Stalin who assumed the ideologic 
authority by purposefully borrowing certain conceptions and screening out the rest from Marxism, 
Mao adopted the simplification and sinification approach meaning that Mao would simplify and 
explain the obscure alien ideology with daily language, often in the slang fashion. For instance, 
Qiang Gan Zi Li Mian Chu Zheng Quan (power coming from the barrel of a gun) and Zao Fan 
You Li (Revolution is Justice) (Gao 2000, p.69). The CCP’s factional activities reached a 
peaceful status after Yan’an Rectification Movement in which Mao’s power was consolidated by 
his ideological dominance and his exclusive control over the party machine and the Red Army. 
Misra (2002) describes this situation as a hierarchical balance with Mao at the hegemonic 
position and a few “mountaintops” formed by sub-leaders along the way of revolution. She 
concluded that any potential move by sub-leader to enlarge his faction would trigger fierce 
resistance from other mountaintops as well as from the paramount leader, Mao Zedong. 
5.1.3 Summary                                         
 
  













     To summarize, the first stage of the CCP and the DPP factionalism share less similarities 
than differences. In terms of similarities, factions from the two parties are comprised of social 
elites, most of them holding college degrees and some them even graduated from foreign 
universities. Nevertheless, the differences are more overwhelming: a) due to their respectively 
distinctive political environments, the formation and disbanding of the CCP factions are more 
frequent than those of the DPP, hence, the CCP factions are less stable than the DPP factions; 
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owing to the fact that the CCP factions mostly are formed based on guanxi or shared 
background, whereas the DPP factions need a high-extent of institutionalization to succeed in 
both the intra-party and general elections; c) ideology is a very important element to both 
factions, it constitutes a vital and indispensable component of ultimate leadership in the CCP 
factions and transforms into many specific issues in the DPP case, such as Taiwan 
Independence and opposition strategy; d) while military factor is another critical component to 
faction power of the CCP, it cannot be found in the DPP factions. Additionally, it is easy to notice 
that exogenous influence, the Comintern, played a decisive role in the CCP’s early factional 
story, whereas the DPP’s factional conflicts mostly revolved around endogenous issues.  
5.2 Stage Two: Factionalism in the Ruling Stage  
Admittedly, the factional balance of DPP collapsed immediately after Chen Shui-
bian won the 2000 presidential election (Chen 2012, p.121). Following that, the DPP 
factions embarked on a process of bandwagon in pursuit of sharing the enormous 
amount of electoral interests. Chen Shui-bian achieved the dominant power that 
spanned across the party, government and Legislative Yuan by co-opting these 
factions. As a result, factions, apart from Chen’s Justice League, were greatly 
contained and factionalism entered into a phase in which factions gathered around 
Chen to jointly rule the newly gained polity.  
In contrast to the tamed factional situation in the DPP, the CCP’s factional 
struggles did not peter out as people would expect in this period, despite the fact that 
Mao had attained absolute dominant power owing to the Yan’an Rectification 
Movement and the CCP’s epic military victory over the KMT government under his 
leadership. Rather, factional activities entered into a stage where power struggles and 
policy disputes frequently broke out under Mao’s sole discretion in the early phase 
and with Deng playing a dominant role in the late period. 
     In this chapter, my analysis wishes to unravel:1) how factionalism elicits the best 
of the DPP’s talents who would help smooth over the power transition period before 
the DPP’s first governance, while impeding the institutionalization of the CCP’s 
governance; 2) although faction imbalance leads to power centralization, this comes 
with a side-effect of damaging the political resilience of the DPP; 3) ultimately, 
factionalism in this stage, had a subversive influence on the CCP. For relentless 





5.2.1 Rising of Bian Faction and the DPP’s Governing Challenge 
     As Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election, the hard-earned factional 
cooperation between the different DPP factions was immediately disrupted. The DPP 
factionalism ushered in a new chapter as the party, for the first time, assumed the 
governing right of Taiwan polity. Understandably, Chen Shui-bian’s faction, the 
Justice League faction, became the major beneficiary of the tremendous amount of 
electoral resources and hastily grew into the most powerful faction. Members of the 
Justice League faction were rewarded generously: Hsu Tain-tsair won the candidacy 
for the mayor of Tainan city; Chen Qimai, a disciple of Chen Shui-bian, was assigned 
to the press spokesman for Taiwan Cabinet, which was considered to be an 
appealing position for whoever performs its duty would automatically be granted extra 
media limelight. At one point, the mini-cabinet team from Chens earlier Taipei 
mayor days constituted the backbone of the Cabinet (Chen 2012p. 131). 
     Moreover, the New Tide faction had already been closely cooperating with Chen 
Shui-bian since the campaign stage. Members of the New Tide faction were very 
adept at drafting ideologies and devising effective policies, therefore, Chen Shui-bian 
valued them greatly. The New Tide faction was gratified with political posts 
immediately after the presidential victory. For example, a leading figure, Qiu Yiren 
was appointed to be the Cabinet Secretary. Other factions did not hesitate to 
bandwagon with Chen Shui-bian in order to seek political reward too. Zhang Junhong, 
a vital character from the Fuliguo faction assumed the position of Head of Cabinet; 
You Xikun, head of You faction, became the General Secretary to the presidency. 
However, the power transition was not an easy process for the DPP. For one, the 
DPP did not have any administrative experience of managing a semi-sovereign entity, 
and for two, the DPP was still a in minority in the Legislative Yuan with the KMT 
exerting overwhelming resistance. Xu (2003 p.351-352) precisely pointed out that, 
although the victory of the DPP declared the collapse of an old political system (in 
which the KMT had been ruling solely for decades), the DPP was not yet well 
equipped to establish a new political order. “The DPP’s shortage of administrative 
authority would potentially lead Taiwan into a phase of political and economic turmoil” 
Xu (2003 p.351-352). To cope with this challenge, it was a strategy of joint 
governance that Chen Shui-bian and the DPP adopted. 
     Instead of nominating someone from his party as the first cabinet head, Chen 
Shui-bian picked Tang Fei who is a senior politician from the KMT. Furthermore, the 
concept of joint governance was widely enforced with the demographic ratio of civil 




department. In many critical departments, the KMT officials were allowed to keep the 
leading positions and the DPP officials assumed the vice seats so as to learn how to 
run the offices from their KMT counterparts. In Liu’s research, she classified the 
process of the DPP’s power transition into three stages, namely, high-degree coalition 
stage in the beginning of the DPP’s rule, low-degree coalition stage as the DPP was 
learning from the experienced KMT, and non-coalition stage when the DPP took over 
the complete control (2004 p.3-4). Moreover, talents from different factions 
guaranteed Chen Shui-bian’s presidency a smooth transition. Chen made the most of 
the DPP talent pool by assigning key leaders to do what they  most excelled at: Hong 
Qichang, Wu Nairen, and Qiu Yiren, who were leaders of the New Tide faction,  
functioned as his political brain because of their extraordinary expertise with political 
ideology innovations; owing to his seniority in the Legislative Yuan (six-term 
legislator), Zhang Junxiong, who was a member from the Justice League faction, was 
appointed to be the cabinet head two times, in 2000 and 2007; the Fuliguo faction 
leader Xie Changting became the party boss of the DPP because of his rich know-
hows of organizing and winning elections. 
     Not even reaching one complete year since assuming the head of cabinet, Tang 
Fei was forced into resignation in the “Fourth Nuclear Plant” incident in 2000, which 
ushered the non-coalition rule of the DPP. At this stage, the DPP’s administrative 
capacity had improved greatly. In the election of Legislative Yuan that took place in 
the following year, the DPP defeated the KMT and became the majority party by 
securing 87 seats itself, together with 13 alliance seats from the pro-DPP party 
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Having dominated at the Legislative Yuan, Chen 
Shui-bian did not hesitate to promote You Xikun, who had an enormous amount of 
economic expertise, to be the head of cabinet, wishing to boost the sluggish economy 
and also prepare for a re-election in 2005. Through the distribution of political 
resources and winning a series of important elections, the Chen Shui-bian faction 
grew into the most powerful faction, so did Chen’s personal power. In April 2002, 
spurred on by the Justice League faction, an amendment that stipulated president 
should automatically assume party boss position was passed in one interim all-
representative meeting of the DPP. Moreover, the members of CEC and CSC were 
respectively expanded to 35 and 15. Among the CEC’s 15 members, four were 
“Automatic Members” or Dang Ran Zhong Chang Wei, three of whom would be 
appointed by president and one to be assumed by party the whip in the Legislative 
Yuan. These changes, which were considered to tailor to Chen Shui-bian’s need, 




that the then candidate nomination regulations had also contributed largely to the 
growth of Chen’s faction. The following figures demonstrate this point. 
 








































   Table 5 documented the nomination rules for legislator election and the final 
election results from 1986 to 2004. When select candidates for legislators, votes 
from party members and polls constituted 70% and 30% respectively in 2001 and 
2004. Understandably, the total party members that have certain factional 
affiliation became a decisive factor when it came to decide which factions’ 
candidates were eligible to represent the DPP to compete in elections. Owing to 
that, factions almost unanimously chose to expand their grass-roots members. 
Convener of the Fuliguo faction, Qiu, estimated that the Justice League affiliated 
Year Increase Rate  Votes 
Percentage 




1986 0.04 0.25 0.20 -0.05 Non-exist 
1989 0.44 0.30 0.23 -0.07 Party Members Votes 
1992 0.51 0.31 0.32 0.01 Party Members Votes 
1995 0.02 0.34 0.34 0.00 Evaluation by Party 
Cadres Accounting for 
50%, Voting from 
Party Members 
Accounting for 50% 
1998 0.38 0.30 0.31 0.01 Evaluation by Party 
Cadres Accounting for 
50%, Voting from 
Party Members 
Accounting for 50% 
2001 0.00 0.34 0.41 0.07 Evaluation by Party 
Cadres Accounting for 
70%, Voting from 
Party Members 
Accounting for 30% 
2004 0.00 0.36 0.41 0.07 Evaluation by Party 
Cadres Accounting for 
70%, Voting from 
Party Members 
Accounting for 30% 




party members skyrocketed from approximately 20,000 to 200,000 during this 
period time (See Hsieh’s dissertation  2013, 239). 
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7 7/36 2 28.5% 11.11% 
New 
Power 
5 5/36 3 60% 16.67% 
New Tide 3 3/36 3 100% 16.67% 
Justice 
League 
5 5/36 5 100% 27.78% 













Table 6 details numbers of seats that different factions won in 
Legislator-at-large and Overseas Taiwanese Legislator. As it indicates, five 
candidates from Justice League were nominated and elected, occupying 


















Nomination Rate Share in all Successful 
Nomination(75 in total)  
New Century 5 5 100% 6.67% 
New Power 5 2 40% 2.67% 
New Tide 22 16 72.73% 21.33% 
Justice League 31 29 93.55% 38.67% 
Fuliguo 17 12 70.59% 16% 
Taiwan Independence 
Alliance 
9 5 55.56% 6.67% 
Non-factional members 51 6 11.76% 8% 
 
																													Table	7	Legislator	Nomination	as	Seen	in	the	DPP	Factions	in	2001(	Zheng	Mingde,	2003).	
      
     Table 7 shows intra-party candidates nomination before 2001 
Legislative Yuan election. Out of 31 the Justice League affiliated 
candidates 29 won the candidacy, which made up the biggest share, 
38.67%, of all qualified candidates. 
 
Faction Numbers of Candidates 
New Tide 25 
Fuliguo 19 
Justice League 28 
Meilidao 5 




      
     Table 8 contains the numbers of legislators from different factions in 
2004 Legislative Yuan election, we can see that Justice League remained 
the most powerful faction. 
     In order to emphasize the role of party in governance and also to allow 
more factions to enjoy the political benefits brought by governance, a 
series of institutional reforms were made among the party, Legislative 
Yuan, cabinet, and the presidential office. In the beginning, party central 




Chen Shui-bian and the party boss Xie Changting to facilitate coordination. 
Later, “Party and Government Discussion Meeting” which was comprised 
by members from party, government and Legislative Yuan was introduced 
in order to tackle the challenges brought by the “Fourth Nuclear Plant”3 
incident. In the later stage of Chen’s second term, “Nine-person Decision-
making Group” that consisted of leaders from factions, party central and 
Legislative Yuan, functioned as the power-sharing mechanism. As a matter 
of fact, along with the power consolidation of Chen’s faction, these 
mechanisms turned less and less important. Chen Shui-bian retained sole 
dominant authority in all arrangements; to some extent, these groups 
became the main enforcers of Chen’s policies. As confirmed by the 
general organizer of the Justice League faction, Qiu Chuizhen, “all these 
institutional arrangements are meant to endorse Chen Shui-bian, the 
ultimate decision-making right lies exclusively on A’Bian’s (Chen Shui-
bian’s) hand” (Hsieh’s PhD dissertation 2013, 239). 
5.2.2 Oligarchization of the DPP Factions 
     Zhan Yizhan, who was the director of the Justice League faction office, 
summarized the first term of Chen as a period of resource distribution, and 
the second term as a phase of fighting for the throne, meaning competing 
for the presidential candidacy that was forthcoming in 2008 (See Zhan’s 
interview in Hsieh 2013, 231). In the past, factions represented a 
mechanism that compromises all different groups within the DPP, and also 
an effective channel of interest distribution. However, this stage of 
factionalism was swiftly replaced by oligarchization due to two changes in 
the DPP. One is that the empowerment of the Justice League faction 
abated the importance of other factions. The other one is that, instead of 
assigning political resources along the factional line, Chen opted for direct 
interaction with factional leaders who would take advantage of what they 
got from Chen to develop their “mountaintops”. Party heavyweights, Su 
                                               
3 The KMT and the DPP hold diametrically attitudes towards nuclear power, especially on the issue whether the 
fourth nuclear plant should continue operating. A series of anti-nuclear plants were organized by the DPP. A 




Zhenchang, Xie Changting and You Xikun, each captured a host of loyal 
subordinates using the political interests at their disposal. 
     The transition from factionalism to oligarchization might have been 
organic, but an oligarchilized DPP jeopardized the effectiveness of 
governance in many ways. First of all, the incumbent officials would put the 
interests of their factional leaders before the interests of the government 
department to which they belong whenever contradictions arose between 
the two. That dragged down the effectiveness of governance. Secondly, 
oligarchization caused policy speculations. Mountaintops would not waver 
to devise many short-term policies to please their constituencies once the 
vicious competitions were triggered among them. For instance, the party 
heavyweight Su Zhenchang was caught between petty and superficial 
societal problems that were cited by newspapers, struggling to come up 
with solutions that were merely able to cope with symptoms rather than the 
root causes (See Xie, 2006). Last but not least, oligarchization caused a 
huge amount of administrative resources to be wasted. The frequent 
promotions, demotions and transfers of different factional members from 
one post to another made the training programs, that are designed for new 
officials, almost futile. In no time, even before the newly appointed official 
had fully grasped the responsibilities and skills corresponding to the seat, 
he or she would be replaced by someone without experience from another 
mountaintop. 
     Approaching the end of second term, Chen Shui-bian intended to 
extend his power influence beyond his presidential term within the party, 
seeking for permanent dominance. In order to do so, he adopted a strategy 
of balance, as seen in the complete-circle rotation among You Xikun, Su 
Zhenchang, Xie Changting and Zhang Junxiong, in the position of cabinet 
head from 2005 to 2008 (see, Executive Yuan Official Site, Republic of 
China). Moreover, the balancing strategy was also considered to a certain 
extent as a way of containing these mountaintops (or factions) that the 




5.2.3 Precariousness of Power Centralization 
     Chen (2006) noted that little by little a mechanism of co-existence, that 
relied on  sharing interests, formed between Chen Shui-bian and the rest 
of the factions within DPP. In this mechanism, factional elites were 
contracted by Chen Shui-bian’s mesh of interests. A hierarchical semi-
patron-client relationship was formed, with Chen Shui-bian being the 
paramount patron at the top, which crippled the tradition of intra-party 
democracy of the DPP. That means that no one in the system could 
perform the duty of checks and balances on Chen Shui-bian any more. As 
a result, the resilience of the DPP as a whole was greatly undermined, for 
the entire party’s fate was exclusively dependent on Chen Shui-bian’s 
personal political ups and downs. As an individual politician has the 
tendency to fail the voters’ expectations, the DPP was effectively 
entrapped by Chen Shui-bian. Unfortunately, Chen Shui-bian did not 
survive the corruption test. The “Chen Family Corruption” case surfaced in 
November 2006, which stormed the Taiwan political world and hit the DPP 
hard(Chen, 2011). 
     Chen’s corruption storm hit DPP from within, which triggered a series of 
mysterious changes, including splintering of the New Tide faction that was 
famous for unity, as well the disbandment of all factions. As the case of 
Chen Shui-bian’s corruption was developing, the dormant factional 
struggle was awakened. Facing the fierce criticism and “Red Tide Anti-
Corruption Protest” campaign from the KMT and Chen Shui-bian’s political 
rivals, 11 legislators of the DPP, that consisted of 7 members of the New 
Tide faction, 3 members from the Justice League faction, and 1 Chen’s 
loyal disciple, not only did not respond, they even went along with these 
anti-Chen Shui-bian movements. That antagonized the so-called “deep 
green” party members who were mostly pro-Chen Shui-bian. The 11 
members were labelled as the “Eleven Renegades” or Shi Yi Kou and 
isolated by pro-Chen Shui-bian factions. All of them failed to be nominated 
to represent the DPP and participate in the 7th Legislative Yuan election in 
2008 due to the “anti-Blue Polls” that strictly invalidated any interviewees 




belittled by losing seven seats in Legislative Yuan and splintered (Chen, 
2011).  
     Moreover, in order to protect the vested interests centering around 
Chen Shui-bian, Chen’s political alliances proposed to disband factions. 
The proposal was surprisingly passed without experiencing much 
resistance in the All-Representative Assembly. As Chinatimes (2006) 
reported after the proposal was passed, the justification for disbandment of 
factions was that “the DPP lacked effective governance rather than intra-
party democracy”, which precisely mirrored the reality that power 
concentration surrounding Chen Shui-bian jeopardized the DPP’s political 
resilience. One person’s misconduct would inculcate the whole 
organization. As Shih (2007, p.95) readily summarized the party politics 
during this phase, “Taiwanese politics has for a long time been dominated 
by elections, personalities and ideologies rather than policies, issues and 
substantial debates…”. 
     The power of Chen Shui-bian and his faction was diminished due to his 
corruption case, once again the DPP returned to a status that did not have 
any dominant faction. Following that, a full-out factional struggle broke out, 
eventually concluding in the All-Representative Assembly in July 2006 with 
the CEC and CSC seats being evenly distributed to the Su Zhenchang 
faction, the New Tide faction, the Green Friendship Union faction, and the 
Xie Changting faction. Out of all the factional leaders, Su Zhenchang and 
Xie Changting grew into the most powerful ones. They were to compete 
with each other for the presidential candidacy in 2008. 
5.2.4 the Revolutionary Mentality in the Reconstruction Stage 
     Similar with the DPP, the CCP entered into a stage of governing the 
whole China for the first time after ousting the nationalist regime, yet the 
power that Mao enjoyed was something beyond Chen Shui-bian’s 
imagination, Mao’s power was absolute. The power Mao had gathered at 
the Yan’an Rectification Movement peaked when the Mao-led red army 
drove out the nationalist government and established PRC. Fairbank 




easier way for people to fully understand the power that he had at his 
disposal at that time. China was in a state of total catastrophe after 
decades of war, what lay in front of Mao and his comrades was a difficult 
task of reconstruction and economy development. To give a better sense 
of how difficult this responsibility must have been, a number of marshals 
had little knowledge apart from how to defeat their enemies on the 
battlefield. What maded the task even more difficult was that Mao, as the 
paramount leader, had not adjusted his class-struggle mentality to a 
nation-building one. In fact, he would keep a revolutionary mind until the 
very end of his life. 
     It turned out that Mao’s governance, which was based upon loyalty 
(Huang,2000), was incompatible with the economy’s development which 
required certain degree of institutionalization and respect of rules. Mao’s 
insistence on a series of irrational economic policies, such as the Great 
Leap Forward (GLF) led to disastrous aftermath causing tens of millions of 
casualties. All these catastrophic policies were to blame for the huge 
problems that were brewing, including marshal Peng Dehuai’s purge and 
the CR that were to come before long. 
     Albeit, Mao being the dominant figure, the factions within the CCP did 
not cease to exist, rather they entered into a dormant status, waiting for the 
appropriate time to resurface. As a matter of fact, military factions naturally 
became structurally more robust after decades of fighting shoulder to 
shoulders with one another. Mao once jokingly called the military factions 
“Gefang Zhouhou” meaning powerful warlords from all over China. Mao 
viewed this, together with Liu Shaoqi’s power expansion, as two great 
threats. Liu Shaoqi was appointed to be the party leader in charge of party 
affairs for Mao starting from the Yan’an era. Naturally Liu’s reputation and 
authority would grow as time went by. Mao devised one solution with two 
purposes which were both to refrain the military mountaintops and to 
contain Liu Shaoqi. Mao ingeniously broke the factional structure and 
realized power redistribution among factions by transferring military 
marshals from their respective field armies that spans all over China to 
Beijing. This move unavoidably set the stage ready for factional conflicts 




specifically Mao’s threat, Liu Shaoqi. In the Gao-Rao incident, prior to CR, 
Mao deliberately misled the newcomer marshal Gao Gang to pick on Liu 
Shaoqi, however, when Gao intended to mobilized his military influence 
Mao “backstabbed” Gao. In an enlarged Politburo meeting, Mao 
sarcastically bashed Gao by claiming there existed another “commanding 
center” (or Si Ling Bu) headed by Gao in Beijing in 1953(Gao, 2000). 
    During the primary stage of governance, Mao tried to control all aspects 
of decision-making, however, he quickly relinquished such a fruitless effort 
after he realized that the amount of governing workload was beyond an 
individual’s capacity. Therefore, Mao retreated to the send-front, 
overseeing the general affairs by distributing responsibilities to several 
senior officials: Liu Shaoqi continuing performing his management of the 
party business; Zhou Enlai taking care of government; and the Central 
Military Committee (CMC) being managed by several key marshals. That 
constituted the so-called “two-front” arrangement (Gao, 2000). 
5.2.5 the “Two-front” Arrangement and “Successor Dilemma” 
     Although, the “two-front” arrangement might have successfully set Mao 
free from the tremendous burden of petty office work, it also came with a 
side-effect that Mao later had to battle with. Huang (2000, p.14) identified 
an intricate contradiction within this arrangement. Despite the fact that the 
sub-leaders who were entrusted to manage different affairs by Mao proved 
their loyalty, their political careers tended to rely only incrementally on the 
actual results of the policies that the department which he was in charge of 
had been carrying out rather than on Mao’s sole confidence. As there pre-
existed differences regarding specific policies between Mao and his first-
front sub-leaders, eventually a wedge was driven in between. These sub-
leaders grew closer and closer due to their common interests that had 
been developed during their respective administrative experiences and 
also because of their shared experience defying Mao’s will. Consequently, 
a sense of power invalidation caught Mao. To reclaim the power that he 
thought he had lost, Mao chose to look for support from outside of the 




Revolution Group (CRG), headed by Jiang Qing, was formed to execute 
Mao’s will in the beginning of the CR in 1965. 
     As the CR unfolded, Mao’s sense of being threatened by the party 
system aggregated. This time, Mao did not hesitate to purge Liu Shaoqi 
and Deng Xiaoping who were in charge of the party machine. However, 
the fall of Liu and Deng meant that the party shackle on the factional 
struggle was removed. Since then, CCP politics started a severely bloody 
phase of factional struggles. Marshal Lin Biao was chosen to be Mao’s ally 
and heir apparent due to his orthodox origin of military from the revolution 
period and his deep-rooted power base in the Red Army by Mao. However, 
after Lin Biao gained dominant control in the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) by expanding the fierce CR to military, Mao was forced into a 
“successor dilemma” that the more powerful the chosen successor 
becomes the less secured the incumbent leader would feel (Huang, 2000). 
Surprisingly, before Mao got a chance to showdown on Lin, the latter 
bizarrely “defected” and crashed when flying to Moscow. Mao faced a dire 
situation in which no capable leaders were helpful to him. The CRG could 
not be relied on, for its entire power hinged upon Mao’s patronage, and it 
did not have any legitimate access to military and party, either. Without 
Mao’s patronage, its influence was merely trivial in the party politics 
(Huang, 2000). 
     It was under such a context that Zhou Enlai reentered Mao’s political 
vision. He was assigned to deal with the aftermath caused by Lin Biao’s 
defection. By finishing cleaning up Lin Biao’s mess, Zhou Enlai proved 
himself again to Mao that he was a loyal and competent executive of 
Mao’s will. In addition, Zhou also had access to both party and military just 
like Mao did. Again, Mao grew paranoid. When Zhou’s prominence 
provoked Mao’s suspicion, Mao brought Deng back into the game to 
contain Zhou’s expanding clout. He did this as Deng, too, had connections 





5.2.6 the Power Paradigm in the CCP Politics 
     This period in the CR qualified Goldstein’s definition of power balancing 
theory (1991). “No faction will be able to achieve overwhelmingly superior 
power”, as Nathan noted (1973, p.66).The falls of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and 
Deng Xiaoping mirrored what constituted the base of ultimate political 
power, namely, the command of military and the ideological dominance. 
Military power is a form of coercive force functioning as an intimidation 
before being put into enforcement, which was best manifested in Mao’s 
famous remark “power comes from the barrel of a gun” or “Qiang Ganzi Li 
Chu Zhengquan”. In terms of the role of ideology, despite scholars of 
Chinese politics concurring that it bears great importance to the CCP, how 
and in what ways it is critical is not sufficiently studied. Brown (2012) noted 
that ideology is crucial to the CCP in two aspects: 1) it offered the CCP a 
justification for revolution at the time when China was in chaos; 2) it 
facilitates compromise and agreements during peaceful governing periods. 
Apparently, Mao was like a prophet for he seized the pulse of the era in 
which people were desperate for a modern sovereign that would not 
tolerate being bullied by the western imperialists. He was also well aware 
that pure imported ideology from the Soviet Union would not be appealing 
to the majority of party members and more importantly the masses. In 
reality it was the sinicized version of Marx-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thoughts, that helped him claimed the ideological high ground over all his 
contestants. In contrast, Deng never held any ideological advantage over 
his rivals in the party. That explained why factional conflicts during Deng’s 
rule became less violent. Deng was often forced to compromises 
whenever factions could not reach agreements, largely owing to his 
weakness in the ideological aspect. 
     The paradigm of power base that Mao had invented, military command 
and ideological dominance, was inherited by party leaders in the 
leadership generations to come, from Deng, to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, 
to Xi Jinping. Over the generations, however, the nature and content of 




chapter using Franz Schurmann categorization of ideology (1968, p.18-
24).  
5.2.7 Deng’s Relative Weakness and Factionalism Eroding Legitimacy 
     After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping ousted Mao’s designated 
successor Hua Guofeng by invalidating his “Two Whatevers4”. Deng filled 
the power void left by Mao. As mentioned above, Deng did not attain 
ideological dominance like Mao did, what he had under his absolute 
control was the PLA. Indeed, Deng had to compromise on the ideological 
front with his rivals by jointly issuing the so-called “Four Cardinal 
Principles” or Si Xiang Ji Ben Yuan Ze that consists of upholding the 
socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the CCP, 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought. The “Four Cardinal Principles”, built 
upon Mao’s legacy, utterly denied Dengthe possibility of innovating 
ideology. Therefore, Deng’s position would always be inferior to Mao’s no 
matter what he achieved. Huang (2000, p.22) discovered that factional 
conflicts broke out frequently and were particularly flammable in Deng’s 
relatively weak domain, ideology. For whoever gained an upper hand in 
the ideological bout would have a better chance to pass the policies that 
he favored. There was also a generational dissolution on the individual 
party elitist level from Mao-in-command to Deng-in-command in regards to 
ideology. Having gone through the catastrophic CR, the new generation 
became less passionate about ideology than about being practical. 
     All in all, factions at this stage agreed almost unanimously that the 
priority of the CCP was to salvage it’s crippled ruling legitimacy. Deng had 
the right formula for this, economic development. Consequently, factional 
struggles flowed into the decision-making of economic policies, which was 
responsible for the “incomplete reform” as Dittmer noted in 1990s. Huang 
(2000, p.24) also discovered that the interests of various political groups 
                                               
4 The “Two Whatevers” (simplified Chinese: ; traditional Chinese: ; pinyin: Ling g fn sh) 
refers to the statement that "We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and 
unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave" (!#'%

!"'$ &).The policy was advocated by the Communist Party of China chairman 
Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor, who had earlier ended the Cultural Revolution and arrested the Gang of Four. 




cannot be represented whenever there existed a dominant force. The 
divergence from the paramount leader’s will is, to a certain extent, an 
indirect way of expressing their political demands by different political 
groups led by sub-leaders. Unavoidably, factional conflicts often erupted 
between the paramount leader and his sub-leaders. On the contrary, when 
the factions co-existed in a status of balance, meaning no particular person 
has overwhelmingly clout over the rest, such as in the middle of 1960s and 
post-1989, the CCP would always score in the economic front. As the 
Reform and Opening up deepened, political pluralism began to thrive. 
Compromises reached between factions enabled those plural interest 
groups to be represented, eventually, Huang hinted that factionalism in the 
CCP would bring democratization to China. 
     Nevertheless, the ruler and the ruled are each others’ antithesis in the 
Political Science world, hence, it is safe to say that what is good for the 
ruled, democratization in this case, can only be detrimental to the ruler, the 
CCP. Factionalism would cause indefinite power struggles that led to 
ineffective governance, military “mountaintoplization” as well as the 
distortion of good policies. Chronic factional bouts would eventually lead 
party members to ideological disillusion. The legitimacy of the ruler would 
only expect to be grinded to nil in the end. 
5.2.8 Comparing the Two Factionalisms in the Ruling Stage 
     There are two common characteristics of the factionalism the two 
parties share in this stage: 1) the two kept similar factional structures. 
Chen, Mao and Deng occupied a dominant position with the rest of the 
factions underneath them. In the DPP case, factional structure first went 
through a process of centralization, then turned oligarchilized. Despite the 
frequent and violent factional struggles, Mao was able to contain all 
factions. He was simultaneously the referee and perpetrator of all factional 
conflicts. Factional struggle attained civility during Deng’s rule, however, it 
kept haunting the CCP in the domains of economy and ideology owing to 
the fact that Deng never achieved ideological dominance! 2) 




Chen Shui-bian extended his power in the government to the DPP with the 
passing of the “President-Party Boss” clause. Similarly, institutionalization 
as seen in the case of CCP was also an indispensable part to the power 
base of the DPP. The “Nine-person Decision-making Group” legitimized 
other factions to claim their own share of the rich political resources. The 
fact that Mao preferred court rule did not affect the amount of power that 
the political elitists possessed was partly due to the power that was 
granted to them by their posts in the functioning institutions, such as party 
organs and military institutions. This point was particularly obvious in the 
CMC. Both Lin Biao and Deng obtained solid power after they have gained 
control of the PLA, Lin being the only vice president of the CMC and Deng 
maintaining the title of president of the CMC until his death. Lin Biao's 
zealous insistence that Mao should remain in the post of president also 
reflected the importance of institution, for Lin Biao would lose his only 
official title in the government, the vice president, if Mao abdicated from his 
position as China’s president (Huang 2012). 
     There are also two apparent differences in regards to the two 
factionalisms. One is that their origins of power varies. Compared with the 
CCP, the DPP operates in an open democratic system, which means that 
the power of factions can either originate from official appointment or 
elections (including senior party positions election, Legislator election, and 
governmental positions elections). In contrast, as the CCP is the only 
ruling party in China, the origins of factional power unanimously follows the 
paradigm initiated by Mao, namely, the command of military and the 
ideological dominance. The other difference is that factionalism has the 
opposite effect on the administrative effectiveness of the two parties. At the 
beginning of its first governing experience, factionalism helped the DPP go 
through the transition period smoothly, in which talents from different 
factions contributed their respective strengths. Later, as the factions 
moved towards oligarchization many detrimental effects emerged, such as 
policy speculations and the waste of administrative resources (Chen, 
2011). Factionalism brought disastrous consequences to the CCP 
governance during Mao-in-command period, and brought about the 




     To summarize, factionalism impacted the two parties very differently 
during the ruling period for both the DPP and the CCP. In the case of the 
DPP, factionalism elicited the best talents from different factions, together 
they innovated institutions, made practical developmental policies and won 
elections. However, power centralization of Chen Shui-bian diminished the 
intra-party democracy tradition, which undermined the resilience of party. 
Factionalism as seen in the CCP caused discontinuity of policies, 
ineffective governance, ideology disillusion, and eventually endangered the 
ruling legitimacy of the CCP. 
5.3 the Making of Xi Party and Tsai Faction 
     In this chapter, I fast forward to present. Through concentrating on two 
dominant leaders, i.e., Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen, analyzing how they 
have achieved power and the initiatives they have been championing, two 
very recent factional stories would be presented. Then, I plan to measure 
similarities and differences between the two factionalisms in current 
political reality. 
5.3.1 Factional Evolvement of the DPP in the Second Opposition Stage  
     After the landslide defeat in 2008 presidential election, the power 
configuration of the DPP faced the fate of a reshuffle. Factionalism of the 
DPP had come to a point where an intergenerational transition was 
inevitable, which would understandably alter factional structure that entails 
the mechanism of intra-party interests distribution and election strategy. It 
was in such a pivotal moment that Tsai Ing-wen who came from the 
technocrat background with no obvious factional affiliation was elected to 
be the new party boss. What lied in front of Tsai Ing-wen were two tricky 
tasks: cleaning up the mess left by Chen Shui-bian and leading the 
dispirited DPP to win as many elections as they could. The DPP was 
suffering in many fronts in the beginning of its second opposition stage. 
The deprivation of administration right due to election defeat, the brewing 
of Chen Shui-bian’s corruption scandal as well as the ferocious factional 




of the DPP’s approval rate. On paper, factions were all disbanded in 2006. 
But, in reality, factions persisted. Instead of existing in the original 
institutionalized form, they were operating covertly using the banners of 
different think tanks or political offices. For instance, shortly after the 
disbandment of the New Tide faction, Taiwan New Society Think Tank 
(TNST) was established which was comprised of nearly the same 
members with the New Tide faction; New Future Think Tank (NFTT) was 
believed to be the embodiment of Su Zhenchang faction.  Nevertheless, 
Huang (2017) noted that those think tanks were at most loose political 
alliances between elite politicians, in terms of formality and rules-binding 
they were far behind factions. 
     As demonstrated above, factions experienced oligarchization during 
Chen’s terms. Correspondingly, binding mechanism between factions and 
its members and the way faction interacts with one another changed, too. 
Tracing back to the budding phase of the DPP factionalism, despite that 
factions possessed the characteristics of institutionalization, they were 
nonetheless rather erratic due to low extent of trustiness and loyalties 
within the factions (Lin 2012). Factions cooperate with factions; members 
of faction work equally with other members from the same faction. They 
shared a common goal that is democratizing Taiwan, which bound them 
together in a cooperative manner. Immediately after Chen Shui-bian was 
elected, such an equal relation started transforming into the patron-client 
form that was based upon interests distribution, which suited seamlessly 
well with the oligarchlized factions. Presumably, the binding mechanism 
has reversed to the cooperative theme during the period of time when Tsai 
Ing-wen acts as the party boss, as was already illustrated by new 
factionalism evolvements within the party, such as how Tsai herself 
recruited Chen Shui-bian faction members and co-opted members from 
the New Tide faction.  
     As to the power configuration of different factions, it was in this period 
that the political power of the DPP founders including the Meilidao 
generation and the Meilidao civil rights lawyers quickly weakened. On the 
contrary, young technocrat generation such as Tsai Ing-wen and Lai 




in 2010, apart from Su Zhenchang and Chen Ju, two prominent founders 
of the DPP, the rest of candidates were all from the new generation. Lin 
(2016) identified that this new generation shared a myriad of traits, they 
have similar political beliefs; they mostly come from a technocrat 
background, either were practicing law or used to be disciples of senior 
politicians. Same background and political experience bind them closely 
together. In strikingly contrast with that the new generation widely 
expanded their political turf, the political seniors were losing strengths at 
an even faster speed. The corruption accusation dragged Chen Shui-bian 
down, the loss of a general election means he no more had affluent 
political resources. The rest of party tycoons, Su Zhenchang, Xie 
Changting, You Xikun were deeply entrenched in the interests mesh 
weaved by Chen during the past eight years as discussed in stage two, 
Chen’s fall resultantly brought them down. In other words, Chen’s political 
incompetence escalated the intergenerational renewal.  
     This intergenerational transition created a power void, which was filled 
by Tsai using party boss position as an inlet towards faction politics. Tsai 
recruited a number of capable figures from other factions along the way 
accomplishing a few successful elections; Tsai faction started taking 
shape. Concerned with the disunity of the party, Tsai insisted that Tsai 
faction should not be an exclusive political force, rather, it encapsulates 
every practitioners and every dreamer in Taiwan (Tsai, 2015).  
5.3.2 Factors behind the DPP Factional Evolvements  
     In retrospect, Chen’s corruption case had a great impact on the power 
structure of the DPP factions. On the party level, the core values as well as 
the political ambition of the DPP, which includes “integrity”, “indigenous”, 
were shattered. As the KMT completed the transition from a Chinese 
nationalist party to a Taiwanese nationalist party, the DPP lost its exclusive 
right of claiming to be “indigenous”. In addition, Chen’s corruption case 
also divided the DPP into two opposite camps, one side calling for 
thorough reflection and reform and the other side claiming it was a case of 




minority party in the Legislative Yuan had also pounded the factional 
configuration greatly. Lin Gang (2012) identified the institutional reasons of 
the DPP factional power transition with the changes of election rules. The 
reason that the DPP is very factionalized is due to that the non-
transferable voting system is adopted to select party leadership. Moreover, 
before the reform on Legislative Yuan election, the multiple seats in one 
district arrangement is believed to be beneficial to middle-size factions. 
Later, when the Legislative Yuan elections adopted the one-seat district 
solution and the candidacy selection became purely based upon public 
approval rate as shown in polls, the factional cooperation was encouraged. 
However, to a certain extent factional cooperation was compromised by 
factional competition that was brought about by the intra-party leadership 
selection and “Legislator-at-Large” nomination in which factional linkage 
play the vital role.  
5.3.3 Road to Taiwan President  
     Tsai’s attitude towards Chen Shui-bian and his political legacy was 
regarded irresolute and hesitant by both pro-Chen and anti-Chen camps 
(Chen, 2011). On the one hand, she tried to prevent any manipulation from 
Chen Shui-bian in the DPP politics. For example, in the case of mayor and 
county chief election in 2009, Tsai wittily substituted the candidate favored 
by Chen with Li Junyi for Tainan county.  On the other hand, Tsai also 
called for Ma Ying-jeou to grant Chen amnesty in multiple occasions. 
However, Chen did not appreciate these overtures from Tsai, for by law 
amnesty means that Chen would have admitted that he had committed a 
crime in the first place. That was far from what Chen had been claiming, 
not guilty. Tsai’s irresolute attitude towards Chen and his political legacy is 
rather comprehensible. What Chen had left at that point was a semi-
patron-client mechanism which encapsulated nearly all party members 
including Tsai Ing-wen herself. That means that almost everyone at some 
point was a beneficiary of Chen’s political favors.  Whoever rashly levels 
the gun to Chen Shui-bian would automatically render himself/herself the 




clean up Chen’s political legacy. On the party level, she skillfully induced 
pressure coming from society and from within the party to push through 
reforming the DPP (Chen 2012). To the factions, she recruited members 
from Chen’s faction as her strategists and the “shadow cabinet” while 
cooperating with other factions.  
5.3.3.1 Back to Streets, Boosting Supportive Rate 
Facing the dilemma caused by occupying only a small portion of seats 
in the Legislative Yuan, Tsai had to take it back to the street, namely, the 
DPP readopted the long-relinquished social movement strategy. 2009 was 
declared to be “the year of social movement” by Tsai; the DPP rehung the 
billboard of Social Movement department that had not been used since 
1996.The social movement strategy calls for the DPP to mobilize as many 
people as possible to go to the street to force the ruling government to 
make concessions in respect to certain policies that are favored by the 
DPP and its supporters taking the measures including protests, 
strikes, sometimes low-degree violence. In other words, the DPP tried to 
have the biggest say in making policy decisions even though it was the 
minority in the Legislative Yuan.  
According to Chen’s analysis (2012, p.25), the DPP’s resorting to social 
movement had its justifications in different aspects: first, in the time when 
party confidence was at its historically low point, social mobilization can 
effectively combat depression and lift the spirit; second, the intense rivalry 
between the ruling party KMT and the DPP diverted public attention from 
Chen’s corruption to other practical matters, which was considered 
beneficial to the party as a whole. By taking it to street, the DPP was able 
to both dominate conversations centering around specific policies and 
excise power. The effectiveness of social movements strategy was hard to 
measure. But, Chen (2012) did not think much of it because he held that 
the political ambience in post-Chen Shui-bian era was diametrically 
different from the era when Taiwan was a one-party authoritarian regime, 
i.e., the early days of the DPP. The reality was that Taiwan has been 





     In addition, Tsai also modified DPP’s deconstructive China policy. 
Before 2012, Tsai Ing-wen’s China policy can be summarized as “Taiwan 
Consensus” which denies “92 Consensus”, and regarded “Taiwan Future 
Resolution” clause as the bottom line and insisted China to treat Taiwan as 
an equal sovereign. However, Tsai and the DPP were defeated by the 
KMT in the election in 2012, which forced them to the realization that 
“Taiwan Consensus” was to blame as the biggest obstacle on the way to 
power. When Tsai restored the party boss in 2014, she reevaluated Cross-
Strait relations and substituted the previous China policy with one that 
emphasizes “Maintaining the Status Quo”. The DPP’s attitude towards “92 
Consensus” which is regarded as China’s bottom line to Taiwan was toned 
down by Tsai. Tsai claimed that the DPP respect historical facts. The 
formation of DPP’s China policy is a joint result of compromise between 
factions (Wu 2016). It is widely accepted that there existed diverse 
opinions regarding Taiwan independence among factions, some factions 
have been vehemently calling for an immediate Taiwan independence 
from China and others preferred a more constructive resolution that does 
not provoke China and jeopardize Taiwanese economy. Tsai’s China 
policy absorbed suggestions from different factions, for example, she 
adopted Xie Changting’s “One China Constitution” and reached an 
agreement with New Tide on “Temperate Independence”. Owing to her 
rich hands-on working experience in the economic sector before becoming 
a full-time politician, Tsai formed her own China policy preference. She 
was fully aware the profound reliance that Taiwanese economy has on 
Chinese economy, so she infused the idea that when dealing with China 
politics and economy should be dealt separately into the DPP’s China 
policy.    
     The DPP has always been constrained by its dire fundraising capacity 
competing with the KMT for elections in past years; the latter often 
overwhelmed the former with the large amount of assets that Chiang family 
brought to Taiwan when they fled mainland China after the civil war. This 
challenge would automatically fell on the party boss Tsai Ing-wen’s 
shoulder. Tsai ingeniously devised the “Three Little Pigs” initiative that 




quantity of piggy banks to individual supporters during the 2012 election. 
Eventually, “Three Little Pigs” received 140,000 donations in total, which 
was 86.9% of all political donation that the DPP had collected. In 
comparison, Ma Ying-jeou only had 11,000 donations. But Ma still 
managed to financially outweighed Tsai with the tremendous amount of 
injection from the KMT party asset. By collecting small donations from 
large amount of constituents, Tsai not only solved the election funds 
problem, she also assured the DPP that they had wide support from a 
great many voters. That contributed decisively to her power consolidation 
in the DPP factional politics. “Three Little Pigs” initiative was extended to 
her personal political base after 2012 election, she formed 
“THINKINGTAIWAN” foundation which is an organization that helps train 
young party members and draft social policies. Later, this small sum 
donation initiative proved again its value in the 2016 presidential election in 
which Tsai finally won the president office.  
5.3.3.2 The Composition of Tsai faction  
     Two forces, the established party elites who were already active in the 
party politics and the newcomers who were cultivated by Tsai, make up the 
so-called Tsai faction. When Tsai decided to participate in the Xinbei city 
mayor election, many factions from the DPP loaned political forces to Tsai. 
The calculation behind such a generous overture from other factions is that 
they could expand their power base by helping Tsai win elections. 
However, Tsai took this great opportunity to develop formal and informal 
relationship with those political elites. In the end, Tsai convinced them to 
join her camp. Those included the backbones of the Justice League Su 
Jiaquan, Liu jianqi and Chen Qimai. In addition, initiatives that aims at 
training young party members such as “Democratic Hope 2014 Youth 
Participation” and “Youth Congress” illustrated that Tsai was also devoted 
to fostering young members. Eventually, the concept of Tsai faction 
officially surfaced right before the 2016 election. In order to win the 
election, factions voluntarily gathered around Tsai, the DPP unity was 
formed again, with Tsai Ying-wen as the core this time. The unity of the 




Large” which is usually considered the most fractured arena for intra-party 
politics. It turned out to be a list that was free from factional bargain and 
manipulation. Ostensibly, the DPP reached a status that “everyone 
belongs to Tsai faction” (Tsai, 2015). 
     The formation of Tsai faction is a result of factional compromise. Tsai 
faction members situated at the middle of Tsai faction and other factions in 
the political spectrum, which required that they have to show loyalty 
simultaneously to both Tsai faction and their original factions. Scholar Hu 
Wensheng (2012 p.106) noted that this double allegiance resulted into a 
power balance between Tsai faction and other factions within the DPP. 
     In reality this balance is rather fragile, when subjected to external 
pressure, it can fall into pieces in no time. Currently, Tsai Ing-wen is 
experiencing an ineffective administration, a sluggish economy growth and 
a chilly relationship with China. In recent years, newly-emerged middle-left 
political forces such as New Power Party (NPP) and Taipei mayor Ke 
Wenzhe are nibbling away DPP’s constituency emanating great pressure 
upon Tsai. In the diplomatic front, Tsai’s “temperate Taiwan independence” 
policy antagonized Beijing. As a revenge, Beijing instigated the long-
suspended diplomatic extrusion strategy, and Taiwan’s diplomatic partners 
decreased from 24 to 20 since Tsai took office.  In order to lessen 
Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, Tsai launched the so-called 
“New Southbound Policy” wishing to engage more Southeast Asian 
countries economically. But the result of this policy was meager (Zhou, 
2018). At present, there are a few new evolvements from within the DPP 
that ratcheted up the pressure on Tsai’s shoulder. Firstly, new factional 
force that is represented by local government chiefs from municipal cities 
and large counties starts entering into the DPP power center. This 
diverges from the traditional model of how factional leaders are generated. 
As Chen and Wen noted (2017), because the DPP did not have access to 
the localities factions existed almost only in the party central in the earlier 
days. As the Taiwanese democratization deepened, more and more sub-
national elections were allowed, which created perfect breeding ground for 
local leaders to expand their power bases, using the rich and exclusive 




factions centering around municipal governors within the DPP now. 
Comparing with the old generations, these factional leaders are physically 
younger but not without rich political experiences. The image that they 
have created is passionate, practical and caring on the mind of their 
respective constituencies. Some of them included the mayor of Taizhong 
city, Lin Jialong, previous mayor of Tainan city Lai Qingde, now the cabinet 
boss. In the case of Lai Qingde, his political career in Taiwan was so 
successful that there have been voices from the DPP and society calling 
for him to join in the 2020 presidential election as a candidate, which is 
seen as a direct threat to Tsai Ing-wen, hence a successor dilemma to the 
DPP politics. To mitigate the threat from Lai Qingde, Tsai had to uplift him 
from Tainan and put him in charge of the government. Moreover, the 
newly-emerged middle-left political forces also have an impact on the 
factional structure of the DPP. The DPP factions still could not reach 
agreement on how to deal with Ke Wenzhe, the mayor of Taiwan capital 
Taipei, whose successful election in 2014 was considered impossible 
without the support of the DPP. At time of writing the DPP still has not 
decide who would be the candidate for Taipei mayor, or whether or not 
there will even be one. That is all because Ke Wenzhe has grown too 
powerful, a bitter defeat would likely to fall on whoever represents the DPP 
to compete with him. 
It is safe to say that once again factions within the DPP are in a status 
of balance centering around Tsai. Comparing with the time when Chen 
Shui-bian was simultaneously the president and party boss, Tsai’s power 
is obviously weaker despite that she enjoys the same power arrangement. 
The reason to this are of twofold: one is that many of Tsai faction members 
are in the same time members of other factions too, which means Tsai 
does not have exclusive control over any of them; two, after the 
devastation caused by Chen’s power centralization, the DPP becomes 
more democratic when it comes to the decision-making on candidate 
nomination and party leadership election. Ultimately, a weakened political 
head who is at the same time president of Taiwan and party boss is 




5.3.4 The Making of Xi-party  
When Xi Jinping took over the power from his predecessor in the 18th 
Party Congress in 2012, what he faced was a party that was fraught with 
epidemic corruption, factional struggles and gerontocracy. Among all the 
tricky problems, Xi chose to clean up factions that had been left by Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao, invalidated gerontocracy and the old successor 
selection mechanism. Fighting against factions is also an initiative of power 
centralization for Xi Jinping. Before diving into the details of how Xi Jinping 
use anti-graft campaign to self-strengthen his power, let us review what 
evolvements the CCP factionalism has made.  
5.3.4.1 Factionalism during Jiang’s and Hu’s rule 
To certain extent, Jiang resembled what Tsai was to the DPP in the 
devastated defeat in 2008 in the political incident that happened almost 30 
years ago to the CCP. They both came from a technocrat background and 
were both adept with dealing political crisis. Most importantly, none of them 
had formed their factional base. Jiang’s power was effectively constrained 
by party seniors despite that he had two paramount titles, namely, the 
party general secretary and the chairman of CMC, under his belt. The 
amount of power that was at his disposal was decided by Deng’s 
gerontocracy. Deng seized this precious window and introduced 
institutionalization to the party politics, for example, the selection of 
successor, and routine retirement. Some of Deng’s legacy are still exerting 
influence till today.  
After comparing the institutionalization between Mao-in-command and 
Deng-in-command, Huang (2008, p.86-87) concluded that Jiang’s power 
relied completely on institutionalized arrangement. In the beginning of 
political institutionalization, Deng forced party seniors into retirement by 
installing new regulations. Then Deng picked Jiang Zemin as the new 
leader, five years later, in the 14th Party Congress Hu Jintao was erected 
as hair apparent after Jiang. According to Deng’s vision, the power of the 
CCP supreme leader is based upon the “three-in-one” and “first among 




should assume three official positions, president of PRC, general secretary 
of the party machine, and the chairman of CMC; the latter emphasizes the 
principle of “intra-party democracy” by putting the supreme leader at the 
superior position of all PSC members. These two arrangements reflected 
the power paradigm as I have demonstrated in the earlier chapters. 
Assuming the chairman of CMC means that the supreme leader is entitled 
to exercise military power if he wishes to; he is not qualified to be the 
president of PRC and general secretary of the party without charting his 
own ideological innovations to the party constitution.  
     As the primary beneficiary of Deng’s political institutionalization, Jiang 
upheld these regulations and made the most use of them. For instance, he 
forced his main political rival Qiao Shi into retirement in 1997 using these 
rules.  Dittmer (2003) held that there was little divergence in ideology and 
policies in this stage between Jiang Zemin and other faction leaders, which 
makes it rather difficult to identify specific factions. However, following 
what have been agreed by the media and Chinese politics observers (for 
example, dwnews, VOA, Huang Jing, Bo Zhiyue, etc.), I manage to come 
up with some general faction classifications. During Jiang’s tenure there 
were the Jiang faction, Li Peng’s power faction (whose members controlled 
China’s energy and electricity industry) and Youth League faction. The 
Jiang faction was comprised of Shanghai gang (politicians who have 
served or are working in Shanghai) and many high officials in whose 
careers Jiang played the master patron, for instance, Zeng Qionghong who 
was a long-time subordinate of Jiang since Shanghai era, the party boss of 
Shanghai Huang Ju, and Wu Bangguo who was a member of PSC and the 
chairman of National Political Consultative Conference (NPCC) at that 
time. In summary, Jiang’s faction was characterized with favoring 
protégées and localism.  
     When the power was handed to Hu Jintao in 2002, factions within the 
CCP experienced a slight reshuffle. Generally speaking, the biggest 
difference was that Jiang Zemin’s power was greatly weakened, even 
though he extended his control of the military for another two years and 
assigned his disciples to many crucial positions before he retreated into full 




power in the early days, it also effectively refrained Jiang’s power from 
lingering on. Jiang’s political clout quickly eroded once he stepped down 
completely. After all, different from Mao and Deng, whose paramount 
power grew out of their personal authority rather than from the official 
positions they were in charge of, Jiang’s power was hinged ultimately upon 
the offices he oversees. Without these official titles corresponding with 
these offices, he was essentially powerless. Indeed, the Jiang faction 
members in the new PSC failed to serve as his power agent, for their 
political well-beings were not so much decided by their erstwhile patron as 
by the incumbent supreme leader Hu Jintao.  “Jiang’s alleged protégés do 
not need him to remain politically powerful. Rather, it is Jiang himself who 
must count on their continuous support if he wishes to extend his 
relevance in policymaking.”; “What really matters to Jiang’s former 
protégés is how, and by what means, they can strike a bargain with the 
current “Big Brother” in charge, Hu Jintao”, marked Huang (2008, p.91). 
     Under such circumstances, Hu Jintao inherited the power without 
experiencing much difficulties, becoming the “first among equals”. 
Nevertheless, similar to what Tsai Ing-wen had encountered, Hu’s power 
base was feebler in comparison with that of Jiang’s, which was epitomized 
by the fact that Hu never achieved the “Core” title.  
     “The term core can perhaps best be understood as that combination of 
informal and formal authority that makes a leader the final arbiter of Party 
issues”, noted Fewsmith (2001, p.163). There were multiple factors that 
were responsible for an incrementally weak leader of the CCP. First of all, 
Jiang is to blame for that he excised gerontocracy on Hu Jintao by 
retaining control over military for extra two years. Secondly, the side-effect 
of an institutionalized party politics is that it caused the power to be evenly 
distributed among different factions, which indirectly resulted in 
undermining the authority of the party central, i.e., Hu Jintao. Factions 
mind their own business in their respective departments which have been 
assigned to them according to the formal politics. Party central is not able 
to discipline factions. The so-called “New Gang of Four” is the best 
showcase when the party organs failed to constrain different factions, 




localism and monopolism. Zhou’s career started in the oil industry, where 
he established the so-called “Petroleum Clique” whose members 
constituted a critical portion of his power base. Later when Zhou Yongkang 
became the party boss of Sichuan province, he turned Sichuan into his 
second faction base where most of the high officials joined his faction. 
When Zhou Yongkang was put in charge of the judiciary department as 
one of nine PSC members, his power naturally extended to law 
enforcement sector. This period of highly fractured Chinese politics was 
defined as Gang Politics by eminent Chinese political scientist He Qinglian. 
She identified the reason of Gang Politics with the rule by man (He 2013) 
and the “Tiao Kuai” administrative structure (He 2015). During Jiang’s and 
Hu’s eras, Chinese factional elites were safeguarded soundly by the 
“Unwritten Rule” or qian guize, which granted the PSC members 
persecution immunity. As a result, the political struggles would 
spontaneously end at the Politburo level. The factional leaders above 
Politburo would be left intact; they would persist undermining the supreme 
leader.  
Hu Jintao’s unprecedented weakness provided the conditions for other 
factions to grow. The extent of factionalization of the CCP peaked in the 
end of Hu’s second term with the party organ, military and many localities 
being controlled by different factions. Two of the so-called “New Gang of 
Four”, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou had the liberation army under their firm 
control, where corruption was epidemic and battle capacity was 
suspiciously far behind China’s potential enemies. A politburo member Bo 
Xilai challenged party central with the Sing Red Song, Strike Mafia or 
Changhong Dahei campaign in the middle-west industrial center, 
Chongqing.  
From Jiang to Hu, the factional structure within the CCP can be 
summarized by the modified nested pyramid model (see, Figure 1) whose 
orginal version nested pyramid was first used by Mattlin (2004) to describe 
political support mechanism in Taiwan. Based on Mattlin’s nested pyramid 
model, typical elite Taiwanese politicians’ support are comprised of “their 
personal networks combine forces to form larger agglomerates of dyadic 




factions (parties) (Mattlin, 2004).” The nested pyramid model of the CCP in 
this period are different in two aspects from Taiwanese politics: first, the 
default power setting of high politicians in the CCP are confined to the “first 
among equals” norm meaning that on the very top layer of this nested 
pyramid there ought to be several equally situated politicians; second, 
owning to the essence of the party-state regime, the CCP’s model does 
not contain any support from regular grassroots, whereas in the very 






     When Xi took over the power from Hu Jintao, he had to adopt the 
historically famous strategy to fight his political rivals, the anti-corruption 
campaign.  
5.3.4.2 Anti-corruption as the Weapon of Political Struggle 
     Zhu and Zhang (2016) have discovered a positive correlation between 
political struggles and corruption accusations in the authoritarian states. 
They found that there would be more corruption accusations against senior 
politicians when the political conflict is in a fierce state. On the contrary, 
there would be less politicians involved with corruption when high politics is 




initiator because not only can it boost his/her approval rate in the public, 
but also is he/she able to oust his/her political rivals.  
The history of anti-corruption to be used as a political struggle weapon 
has not been long for the CCP. It started taking shape in Jiang Zemin era. 
The case of the previous politburo member and simultaneously Beijing 
party boss Chen Xitong can be seen as the beginning of such a practice. 
Before Chen Xitong case in 1995, political struggles within the CCP were 
dealt with politically in the way that whoever was involved would be 
charged with primarily political accusations in which political labels such as 
revisionist, rightist or “two whatevers” were frequently used. Chen Xitong 
was the first senior politician who was prosecuted for corruption whereas 
the actual reason was widely believed to be his rivalry with Jiang Zemin. 
Chen’s case was also believed to have drawn a boundary in terms of 
politicians on what levels can be indicted. Later, it materialized as an 
unwritten rule that whoever enters the PSC would have judicial immunity, 
namely, no PSC members would be prosecuted.  
Corruption accusation as the political struggle weapon was finalized as 
a paradigm of intra-party struggle in Chen Liangyu case When Hu Jintao 
devastated the Shanghai Gang by prosecuting the Shanghai party boss 
and politburo member Chen Liangyu for illegal appropriation in 2006. It 
was widely believed to be a punch thrown by Hu to consolidate his power 
by taking down Jiang’s major protégé. Corruption charge became an 
episode of bizarre soap drama in Bo Xilai’s case in which love affairs, 
poisoning and homicide were enigmatically mixed. Xi Jinping added more 
political connotations to corruption. In addition to the usual corruption and 
seduction from morality accusations, Xi does not hesitate to warn his 
political rivals that they failed to demonstrate political allegiance to him. 
The 19th Party Congress report called Zhou Yongkang, Sun Zhengcai and 
Ling Jihua “bloated with political ambition” or (zhengzhi yexin pengzhang) 
( the Report of 19th Party Congress). Party media outlet Qiushi criticized 
Bo Xilai for defying political norms and conventions (Bai 2015). Xi Jinping 
borrowed the inspection system from ancient dynasties to conduct anti-
corruption campaign that was spearheaded by Wang Qishan. However, 




essentially a political struggle weapon for what it practices is merely 
ineffective self-inspection. The right of who is to be taken down by anti-
corruption inspection lies solely in the hand of Xi Jinping.      
     Using anti-corruption to take down his political rivals is simultaneously a 
process of power centralization for Xi Jinping. Xi’s princeling background 
made him a widely acceptable hair apparent in the party. Constrained by 
the “successor dilemma”, Xi Jinping was a naturally weak leader even 
though he took up all of “three-in-one” arrangement attained the “first 
among equals” status when he took the power from Hu Jintao. His grip on 
military was far from absolute; he has not yet devised his own ideological 
contribution. By carrying out anti-corruption campaign, Xi cleaned his 
political rivals in the party, government and military, he then filled in those 
seats with his protégés. Eventually, Xi has obtained exclusive control over 
the regime. Moreover, anti-corruption campaign has also conveniently 
salvaged the ruling legitimacy for the party.     
Based upon the paradigm of power in the CCP, Xi Jinping now has 
absolute control on both the military and ideology. In the military, Xi Jinping 
uprooted Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou as well as their protégés. Then, He 
dismissed the old “Four General Departments” (Si Zongbu, including the 
General Logistics Department, the Headquarters of the General Staff, 
General political Department, General equipment department), and 
substituted seven military regions with five threatres of battle operation.  
On the ideological front, while keeping previous contributions from Mao 
Thought to “Scientific Outlook on Development” intact he also made a very 
tangible contribution. Almost immediately after he assumed the power the 
“Chinese Dream” was launched, by reviewing and summarizing the first 
three-decade under Mao and second three-decade under Deng, he made 
a commitment that his tenure would see to the realization of Chinese grand 
rejuvenation (Wang Yi, 2016).  
Comparing Xi’s ideological discourses with those from Jiang and Hu, it 
is obvious that despite the persistence of opaque political languages its 
volume is shrinking and its content is more materialized. The “Three 
Representatives” from Jiang was viewed by He Qinglian (2013) as a 




it helped the CCP improved legitimacy and consolidated ruling foundation; 
when interpreting from the literal meaning Hu Jintao’s “the Scientific 
Outlook on Development”, it is not difficult to discover that the primary goal 
of Hu’s ideological contribution is to combat with environmental problems 
and cope with the worsening income inequality issue. The “Chinese 
Dream” that connotes a rejuvenated China whose people will be happily 
living in a well-off society is undeniably a more concrete one than both 
Jiang’s and Hu’s ideological claims. To consolidate his ideological 
contribution, Xi Jinping chartered the “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” to both party constitution and 
national constitution. The fact that Xi Thought bears his name proves that 
his position in the ideological aspect is much stronger than his two 
predecessors, which put him in a position shouldering Mao. 
5.3.4.3 The Composition of Xi-faction 
     At the moment, Xi Jinping faction is mostly comprised of his friends and 
previous subordinates from his earlier political years. Wang Qishan, the 
anti-corruption czar, was reportedly Xi Jinping’s friend from the Educated 
Youth days; the newly-promoted vice premier Liu He who is also a 
politburo member was Xi’s classmate from middle school; many members 
of Xi Jinping faction whose relationships with Xi trace back to when Xi was 
in charge of Fujian and Zhejiang province are now occupying crucial seats 
in the government, party organs as well as the military, such as the current 
Chongqing party boss and politburo member Chen Miner who was 
overseeing the propaganda department in Xi Jinping’s provincial 
administrative team in Zhejiang province. The personnel arrangement of 
19th Party Congress illustrated that Xi Jinping had broken many 
conventions created by Deng. First, although the PSC had not been 
abolished as predicted by some observers, Xi Jinping does distance 
himself from other members in the PSC in terms of the amount of power 
they each possess informally and formally. Xi Jinping ordered that all 
members of politburo to submit a yearly report to himself and party central; 
the responsibilities that used to be covered by members of PSC are 




president of central party school is to be assumed by the PSC member 
who is in charge of ideology, Wang Huning in this case, rather than by a 
politburo member Chen’xi who is coincidentally Xi Jinping’s classmate from 
their Tsinghua University days. Another example would be Liu He whose 
vice premier position is suspiciously overshadowing Premier Li Keqiang 
(Hornby and Mittchell 2018). 
     Secondly, the so-called Seven up, Eight downor Qishang Baxia, 
age limitation was unshackled, as seen in Wang Qishan’s case. Although 
Wang’s age had reached 68, he did not retire from formal positions like 
other fellow PSC members, instead he just swore in to be the vice 
president of PRC in this year’s Two Sessions. Thirdly, by aborting the 10-
year tenure limitation clause in the constitution, Xi would likely to remain in 
the power for more than two terms, which is considered a major disruption 
of Deng’s succession arrangement.   
Apart from his endeavors to centralize power in party, government and 
military as discussed above, Xi once and for all solved the chronic 
succession dilemma for himself. First Xi sidelined the speculative leader 
of 6th generation Hu Chunhua by postponing his promotion to the PSC 
and put Sun Zhengcai who was the party boss of Chongqing and politburo 
member on trial for corruption. It is safe to conclude that the CCP is 
currently unprecedentedly “harmonious”. Jiang’s last batch of protégés 
were forced into retirement in the 19th Party Congress; Hu did not plan to 
excise gerontocracy when he stepped down. Xi has the CCP under his 
control. Officially, he enjoys the “Three-in-One” arrangement. In the 
informal factional politics, he uprooted nearly all active factions and 
promoted his protégés to the vital posts left by those faction 
members.  Currently, the CCP factional status can be seen has achieved a 
hierarchy structure (see, Figure 2) with Xi at the very top, the CCP ’s 
hierarchy system comprises of the rest of elitist politicians and the retired 
party seniors behind them, one level lower than Xi Jinping. Each of these 
politicians from the second level has a similar hierarchical structure with 




they keep relationships or alignments with someone at the same level in 































     In review of the two factional stories in this thesis, I have demonstrated 
the general similarities and differences between the two manifestations of 
factionalism that operate in the same Confucian cultural context.  
     The early phase of the two factionalisms poses more differences than 
similarities as detailed in chapter 5.1. For the CCP, it was during this 
period that the power paradigm which consists of militaristic and 
ideological dominance that was established, which would become a 
common practice adopted by generations to come. What I also discovered 
is that the revolutionary stage demands a united and spiritually-localized 
political force, as reflected in the fact that until Mao had achieved the 
dominant power the CCP’s political gains were rather meager and 
unstable. However, under Mao’s strong man leadership, the CCP 
managed to contribute to the eventual defeat of the Japanese imperial 
army and drove the KMT out of mainland China. As to the factionalism in 
the initial stage of the DPP, what I want to highlight is that the factionalism 
set up a stage for all political forces to discuss, debate and devise the most 
effective power-achieving or democratization strategy, which is thoroughly 
mirrored in the strategic debate between the Meilidao faction and the New 
Tide faction. Factionalism is fairly compatible with the democratic 
ambience in the DPP case. The democratic decision-making arrangement 
regarding party affairs created a permissive provision for the political 
intellectuals to excel. In order to sustain this facilitating mutual-beneficial 
mechanism, the DPP has to safeguard the intra-party democracy from 
being jeopardized, which has become increasingly challenge when they 
have achieved power.   
     In the ruling stage, historical facts from the two parties reinforce what 
have been established during the first phase. Regardless of whether Mao’s 
ultimate power was undermined by the “Two-Front” arrangement or not, 
the fierce factional conflicts caused by destroying the party arrangement in 
the CR showcased the importance of the existence of a dominant political 




factions greatly damaged the ruling legitimacy of the party. In addition, the 
reason that Mao was able to hold onto the paramount position in one of the 
most anarchic political movement in human history is due to that he was 
the only one who had both the military force and the ideology under his 
absolute control. The power centralization of power by Chen Shui-bian 
devastated the intra-party democratic arrangement that is essential for the 
factionalism to function, which is to blame for the deprivation of power in 
2008 in the DPP case.   
     The recent political maneuvers from both Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen, 
to some extent, are the manifestations of the two factionalisms in 
comparison. All Xi’s political initiatives, be it anti-corruption campaign or 
the establishment of multiple ad hoc institutions can be summarized into 
the power centralization theme. For Xi, rich political experience and 
privileged information access owing to his princeling background assured 
him that a factionalized party would only accelerate the erosion of the 
crippling legitimacy resulted by the market reform during the past four 
decades.  Comparing with her predecessors, the concessions that Tsai 
has made in order to unite the factionalized DPP is more obvious. For the 
starters, Tsai faction is no more a faction per se, instead it is a term that 
represents the incumbent political force centering on Tsai Ing-wen. As a 
result, Tsai has to share her protégés with other factional leaders in the 
party politics, namely, the double-allegiance. Such a double-allegiance is a 
result of a more democratized DPP and Taiwan politics.  
     To summarize, the comparison between two factionalisms in the same 
cultural pre-text points to that factionalism in the closed one-party system 
tends to be a critical obstructive factor for the ruling party creating 
instability, moutaintoppism and dictatorship while eliciting the best political 
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